# Wiki Doc---Round 1---NU 21

# 1AC

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### Plan---1AC

#### Plan: The United States federal government should prohibit private sector business practices that violate an effective competition antitrust standard.

### Adv---1AC

#### The advantage is the economy:

#### Antitrust law is failing now---current market consolidation undermines innovation, slows growth, and suppresses productivity. Promoting competition solves.

Fiona M. Scott Morton 20. Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics at the Yale University School of Management. “Reforming U.S. antitrust enforcement and competition policy,” https://equitablegrowth.org/reforming-u-s-antitrust-enforcement-and-competition-policy/.

Evidence that antitrust laws are falling short is plentiful. Many cartels go undiscovered, and tacit collusion is probably even more prevalent because it is harder for antitrust enforcers to prosecute and deter.9 Anticompetitive horizontal mergers (between rivals) appear to be underdeterred.10 A variety of clever strategies used by incumbents to exclude entrants, either by purchasing them when they are nascent or using tactics to confine them to a less threatening niche or forcing them to exit have been successfully deployed in recent years, often when antitrust enforcement is late or absent.11

Each of these sources of concern can be critiqued, but together they make a compelling case. Some of the evidence may have benign explanations in part, such as the growing importance of fixed costs, for example, when creating software or pharmaceuticals that leads naturally to higher markups, or the increasing benefit of being on the same platform with other users (known as “network effects” in the case of a social media site). Firms in industries with high fixed costs or large network externalities may exhibit high profits and productivity and low labor shares, and may earn high profits because they had a good idea early and executed well, thereby getting adoption from many consumers.12 Nonetheless, the overall picture is clear that market power has been growing in the United States for decades. Moreover, even where the explanation for growing market power is benign, we must ensure that companies do not use anticompetitive tactics to protect their position.

Firms with market power need not compete aggressively to sell their products, so they tend to raise prices, reduce quality, and/or innovate less. Market power can also contribute to slowed economic growth by, for example, suppressing productivity increases.13 Theoretical and empirical economic studies convincingly show that innovation is harmed by anticompetitive conduct.14

This is why antitrust enforcement is such a terrific policy tool to strengthen competition—it does not come with an efficiency downside, as do most policies that redistribute income. Policies that enhance competition are unambiguously beneficial for efficiency, as well as inclusive prosperity, with minor qualifications.15 Other policies for addressing inequality, in particular, such as labor market and tax policies, may create disincentives or allocative efficiency losses that must be weighed against their distributional benefits. Policies to enhance competition, by contrast, offer what is close to a free lunch.16

#### The plan solves---and effective competition standard reinvigorates antitrust.

Marshall Steinbaum & Maurice E. Stucke 19. Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Utah. Douglas A. Blaze Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. “The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust.” <https://marshallsteinbaum.org/assets/steinbaum-and-stucke-2020-effective-competition-standard-uchicago-law-review-.pdf>.

America, as legal and economic scholars are increasingly noting, has a market power problem. The emerging evidence points to less competition, higher markups, greater concentration, and widening wealth and income inequality. The current state of competition law benefits the select few—at the expense of nearly everyone else.

Our antitrust laws are supposed to deal with concentrated economic power. The problem is that the laws have been hijacked in two ways. First, ideologues narrowed the substance of antitrust from addressing a variety of goals to focusing solely on the concept of consumer welfare—namely, that harm to competition within the legal meaning of the antitrust laws consists solely of harm to consumers and their welfare, as measured almost exclusively by price and quantity effects in output markets. Second, some courts and enforcers went even further, declining to find antitrust liability in conduct that harms consumers on the theory that it carries other benefits, like long-run economic growth. Recent US Supreme Court decisions, including Ohio v American Express Co, and the US District Court’s decision to allow the AT&T/Time Warner merger illustrate how antitrust, under the prevailing consumer welfare standard, has been weakened and distorted beyond all recognition. Courts have elevated the burden of proof on the government and other antitrust plaintiffs to such an extent that the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts have become unenforceable for many anticompetitive practices, other than cartels.

If the United States continues with a light-if-any-touch antitrust review of mergers and turns a blind eye to abuses by dominant firms, concentration and crony capitalism will likely increase, competition and our well-being will decrease further, and power and profits will continue to fall into fewer hands. Startups, small and midsize firms, and Americans more broadly—as workers, consumers, and democratic citizens—will be left to the beneficence or spite of a few powerful, but arbitrary, corporations.

This trend is reversible if we restore antitrust as a guarantor of effective competition. To tackle today’s market power problem, we offer an effective competition antitrust standard to replace the prevailing consumer welfare standard, which courts and scholars have interpreted differently (and at times inconsistently). The effective competition standard restores the primary aim of the antitrust laws—namely, the dispersion and deconcentration of significant private power wherever in the economy it is to be found, including throughout supply chains and in the labor market.

#### It's enforceable and sufficient.

Marshall Steinbaum & Maurice E. Stucke 19. Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Utah. Douglas A. Blaze Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. “The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust.” <https://marshallsteinbaum.org/assets/steinbaum-and-stucke-2020-effective-competition-standard-uchicago-law-review-.pdf>.

The effective competition standard differs from both the consumer welfare standard and the total welfare standard in that it expressly departs from the partial-equilibrium analysis of a single market as the basis for antitrust analysis. The effective competition standard further differs from the consumer welfare standard in four important ways:

• First, a substantial lessening of competition suffices for liability. Enforcers and courts need not demonstrate how the lessening of competition harms consumers, nor balance the harms to one set of stakeholders against the supposed benefits for another. In this respect, the effective competition standard makes antitrust more enforceable.

• Second, it recognizes that competition needs competitors. Thus, it takes a tougher stance on monopolistic, predatory, and exclusionary practices, which often reduce the competitive opportunities for entrants and rivals.

• Third, unlike the consumer welfare standard, which considers the impact only on consumers, the effective competition standard protects market participants throughout the supply chain, including workers and sellers.

• Finally, by eliminating the precarious step of how the lessening of competition will harm consumers’ welfare, the effective competition standard restores the purpose of the Clayton Act to “arrest restraints of trade in their incipiency and before they develop into full-fledged restraints violative of the Sherman Act.” As Congress noted, “A requirement of certainty and actuality of injury to competition is incompatible with any effort to supplement the Sherman Act by reaching incipient restraints.”

To promote competition and innovation in our heavily concentrated markets, the effective competition standard would depart from today’s light-touch antitrust policies in the following areas.

#### Scenario 1 is Growth:

#### Sustained anti-competitive behavior is regressive and makes economic collapse inevitable.

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The direct cost of anti-competitive behavior is high. Many studies estimate this cost by implied price overcharge, typically stemming from identified cartels. A common approach to estimating the price overcharge consists in applying a difference-in-difference technique, that is, by comparing prices in a market before and after an infringement was identified (e.g., a cartel) to a “counterfactual” market in a different location or product market where no infringement was identified.3 The estimated price overcharges in advanced economies are found to be large on average, ranging from 15 to about 50 percent. Ivaldi et al. (2017) extends these estimationsto 20 developing economies, using a database of over 200 major cartel episodes over 1995–2013. They estimate that the harm to the economy in terms of excess profits resulting from price overcharges could reach about 4 percent of GDP, accounting for the probability of undetected cartels. The cost of cartels could extend to overcharges in intermediate goods, ultimately affecting finished products, as well as procurement of public goods, or it could also affect the economy through a reduction in output (World Bank-OECD 2017). Even without cartels, anti-competitive behavior would result in higher prices and lower production.

There is also growing evidence that the lack of competition not only affects more strongly the poorest countries but also hurts the poor more in each country. Higher market power in food, beverages and medicines was shown to be regressive, that is, they hurt more the poorest, as shown using Mexican data (Urzua 2013). Similar results exist in the context of advanced countries (e.g., Creedy and Dixon 1998 and 2000). There is also evidence that prices in sub-Saharan Africa are higher than in other developing regions, controlling for income and other factors. The extra cost of living in this region is negatively correlated with aggregate measures of competition (IMF 2019a). OECD (2017), using a calibrated model on a selected group of advanced countries, finds that market power could be responsible for a sizable increase in the wealth of the richest 10 percent and a large reduction in the income of the poorest 20 percent.

The decline in the labor share has also been interpreted as a sign of rising market power. Labor share has been decreasing in the U.S. and other advanced economies (IMF 2019b). This decline in labor share could be explained to a large extent as a result of the Information Technology (IT) revolution as argued by Aghion and others (2019). This revolution allowed superstar firms to expand into many sectors of the economy. As these firms have higher markups and lower labor shares than non-superstar firms, the decline in aggregate labor share and corresponding increase in aggregate markups reflect a “composition effect”. In other words, it is not the result of a within-firm increase in markup or a decline in labor share. Evidence of the predominance of a “between-firm” (or “composition”) effect over a “within-firm” effect is provided by De Locker and Eeckout (2019) and Baqaae and Farhi (2019). IMF (2019b) shows that the “reallocation” effect is pronounced in the U.S. but less so in other advanced countries. The long-term effect of this increasing hegemony of superstar firms has been to discourage innovation and entry by non-superstar firms, thereby leading to a decrease in aggregate productivity growth, broad-based growth, and business dynamism. This increasing hegemony, in turn, has been facilitated by an insufficient regulation of mergers and acquisitions, in other words by a competition policy, which has not adapted to the digital economy.

#### State-based market interventions are key to sustainable growth. The alternative to well-measured corrections is an unfettered and regressive free market.

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There is a positive correlation between long-term growth and poverty alleviation. More specifically, Lant Pritchett argues, based on cross-country patterns, that “broad-based growth, defined as the process that raises median income, is far and away the most important source of poverty reduction.”9 The sharp decline in poverty rates in China (about 800 million people escaped poverty) amid the two decades of break-neck growth is the starkest illustration. As discussed, innovation-based growth based on Schumpeterian creative destruction is key to productivity gains and sustained growth. The question is how to achieve broad-based, high and sustained growth which means to spur the emergence of good paying jobs. This is perhaps one of the most difficult and debated questions in economics.

The standard view shared by most economists over the last few decades is that “horizontal policies”, that is improvements in education, the quality of institutions, infrastructure, business environment, and regulations are key. Many of these policies tackle what is known as “government failures” as described in Rodrik (2005). In other words, state intervention should limit itself to providing public goods and the provision of a good environment while crucially ensuring an adequate level of competition. In this context, firms would have the incentive to invest and deploy efforts to be competitive through improvements in productivity and innovation to offer new and better-quality goods among others.

However, growth can be harmed by anti-competitive behaviors or distortive policies which can take different and subtle forms and are not always easy to gauge. Among these, imposing barriers to entry or helping non-performing firms remain in business, could have a substantial negative effect. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) emphasize the importance of input reallocation effects. They show that aggregate productivity differentials can be explained by differences in terms of the distribution of firms’ productivity. This means that relatively less productive firms have access to a considerable share of the resources. They argue that it is harder for a more productive firm to grow but also easier for a less productive firm to survive in India than in the U.S. for example. In the same vein, Aghion (2016) suggests that that there is more business dynamism in the U.S. than India, that is more firms enter and exit, which would explain input misallocation and differences in income per capita.

Compared to the U.S., potential constraints in developing economies such as India include more rigid capital markets and labor/product markets, the lower supply of skills, the poorer quality of infrastructure, and the lower quality of institutions to protect property rights and to enforce contracts. However, even if markets are perfectly competitive and an adequate environment is ensured, the economy may still not reach its full potential. This is because of “market failures,” which typically happen in the presence of externalities. They are at play when firms and workers do not fully internalize the effects of their decisions on the broader economy and their dynamic implications. Typically, they are learning externalities, coordination failures, or information asymmetries (Rodrik 2005).

As argued by many, (e.g., Arrow 1962) and Matsuyama 1992) some activities entail higher productivity gains, or more learning potential, for an economy compared to other traditional activities such as non-tradable services or agriculture. Firms may not be fully aware of these productivity gains, leading to lower output in high-productivity sectors and lower relative incomes over time. The coordination failure is based on the idea that a critical size of the modern sector is needed for a firm to enter it. It would be profitable for a firm to invest in a modern sector only if there are enough firms investing simultaneously in other modern sectors. If many firms invest together in modern sectors, described as the “big push,” economy reaches a higher level of productivity and development (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943, Murphy et al. 1989). Lastly, information asymmetries exist if there is imperfect information about new markets and products, and firms underinvest as a result (Hausman and Rodrik 2003). This is clearly seen in firms trying to export and penetrate new geographical markets with their products.

In theory, tackling these externalities would necessitate a state intervention, broadly defined as industrial policy. However, the scope, the tools and whether it could in practice be superior to a more “laissez-faire” approach, leaving the outcome to unfettered competition, is the object of an ongoing debate. At the heart of the debate lies the definition of what constitutes a “modern” sector, which is conducive to productivity gains and spillovers to the rest of the economy. While it is typically associated with manufacturing (Matsuyama 1992 and Krugman 1987) or related to the concept of sophistication (Hausman, Hwang and Rodrik 2007 and Cherif and Hasanov 2019), others argue that service sectors could also play a role (IMF 2018). More important for inclusive growth, if a sector is to be targeted, it should help achieve broad-based growth to contribute to poverty alleviation. In practice it means that it should also generate (directly or indirectly) enough employment, and the level of skills to fill those jobs should be realistically met over the medium term.

The other key question relates to how state intervention to tackle externalities could curtail or distort competition. Indeed, state interventions of the past typically followed the model of import-substitution policies. The main idea was to protect domestic producers from international competition by imposing barriers to trade, such as high tariffs. In many cases, the curtailment of competition went further and encompassed the domestic market as countries relied on one or very few “champions” to achieve import-substitution goals. The many past failed cases in Latin America and the Middle East imply that such policies may be counterproductive in general (Cherif and Hasanov 2019). The comparison of Malaysia’s foray into automotive industry in the 1970s with its champion Proton to the success of Korea’s Hyundai is a case in point (Cherif and Hasanov 2019b). After decades of support and protection from domestic and international competition, Proton depended on imports of critical inputs, including the engine. The high tariffs to protect it also meant that consumers had to pay higher prices for lower quality products. In comparison, although Hyundai benefitted from state support as well, it was also forced early on to compete both on the domestic and international markets. It could be argued that competition provided Hyundai with an incentive to innovate and take advantage of economies of scale.

Moreover, support for firms could be pursued without necessarily implying less competition. Aghion and others (2015) develop a simple model showing that targeted subsidies can be used to induce several firms to operate in the same sector, and that the more competitive the sector is, the more it will induce firms to innovate in order to “escape competition” (Aghion et. al. 2005). Of course, a lot depends upon the design of industrial policy. Such policy should target sectors, not particular firms (Aghion 2016). Using Chinese firm-level panel data, Aghion and others (2015) look at the interaction between state subsidies to a sector and the level of product market competition in that sector. They show that TFP, TFP growth, and product innovation (defined as the ratio between output value generated by new products to total output value) are all positively correlated with the interaction between state aid to the sector and market competition in the sector. In other words, the more competitive the recipient sector is, the more positive the effects of targeted state subsidies to that sector are. Infact, for sectors with low degree of competition the effects are negative, whereas the effects become positive in sectors with sufficiently high degree of competition. Finally, the interaction between state aid and product market competition in the sector is more positive when state aid is less concentrated.

Yet, there are externalities that can be tackled without curtailing competition with the potential to have a sizable contribution to broad-based growth and poverty alleviation. These are typically related to informational asymmetries. Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), f or example, show that interventions to improve management practices in Indian small firms can significantly improve productivity. So did the productivity missions of the Marshall Plan in Europe after the WWII (Giorcelli 2019). In the same vein, Atkin et al. (2017) showed that Egyptian rug producers can be helped to access export markets by tackling informational asymmetries and coordination failures. In other words, they showed that interventions such as export promotion agencies can help SMEs advertise their products in foreign markets and act as a communication channel between them and customers. They also showed that export activities helped small producers improve their quality and value added which confirms the importance of export orientation. This focus on SMEs can help increase productivity and tackle inequality at the same time.

The trade-off between the benefits and costs of state intervention suggests that the way the state intervenes in the economy is crucial. This intervention needs to be cognizant of exacerbating government failures such as rent-seeking and corruption. Moreover, even if these interventions are successful in the sense that they create competitive industries and contribute to growth, they should avoid creating “islands” of relatively advanced sectors. If these sectors are disconnected from the rest of the economy, broad-based growth may not be sustained, and it would exacerbate inequality. For example, thanks to interventions and targeted policies, Costa Rica managed to foster a high-tech sector in electronics and health instruments (Spar 1998). Although it led to higher growth and declining poverty as well as productivity improvements in agricultural sectors, high inequality persisted while growth policies for inclusiveness were missing (Ferreira, Fuentes, and Ferreira 2018).

#### COVID creates an economic brink---recovery is strong now because of effective monetary policy, but we’ve hit the zero-lower bound.

Christopher Rugaber 21. Associated Press. “Federal Reserve keeps key interest rate near zero, signals COVID-19 economic risks receding.” https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-fed-interest-rates-economy-20210428-bumyc3ynpza6ri4ygsntmdsmya-story.html.

WASHINGTON — The Federal Reserve is keeping its ultra-low interest rate policies in place, a sign that it wants to see more evidence of a strengthening economic recovery before it would consider easing its support.

In a statement Wednesday, the Fed expressed a brighter outlook, saying the economy has improved along with the job market. And while the policymakers noted that inflation has risen, they ascribed the increase to temporary factors.

The Fed also signaled its belief that the pandemic’s threat to the economy has diminished, a significant point given Chair Jerome Powell’s long-stated view that the recovery depends on the virus being brought under control. Last month, the Fed had cautioned that the virus posed “considerable risks to the economic outlook.” On Wednesday, it said only that “risks to the economic outlook remain” because of the pandemic.

The central bank left its benchmark short-term rate near zero, where it’s been since the pandemic erupted nearly a year ago, to help keep loan rates down to encourage borrowing and spending. It also said in a statement after its latest policy meeting that it would keep buying $120 billion in bonds each month to try to keep longer-term borrowing rates low.

The U.S. economy has been posting unexpectedly strong gains in recent weeks, with barometers of hiring, spending and manufacturing all surging. Most economists say they detect the early stages of what could be a robust and sustained recovery, with coronavirus case counts declining, vaccinations rising and Americans spending their stimulus-boosted savings.

#### Eroding financial resilience causes war---that overcomes traditional barriers to conflict.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram & Vladimir Popov 19. Former economics professor, was United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, and received the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought in 2007. Former senior economics researcher in the Soviet Union, Russia and the United Nations Secretariat, is now Research Director at the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute in Berlin “Economic Crisis Can Trigger World War.” <http://www.ipsnews.net/2019/02/economic-crisis-can-trigger-world-war/>.

Economic recovery efforts since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have mainly depended on unconventional monetary policies. As fears rise of yet another international financial crisis, there are growing concerns about the increased possibility of large-scale military conflict.

More worryingly, in the current political landscape, prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising economic inequality, chauvinistic ethno-populism as well as aggressive jingoist rhetoric, including threats, could easily spin out of control and ‘morph’ into military conflict, and worse, world war.

Crisis responses limited

The 2008-2009 global financial crisis almost ‘bankrupted’ governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the world economy from the brink, but soon switched from counter-cyclical fiscal efforts to unconventional monetary measures, primarily ‘quantitative easing’ and very low, if not negative real interest rates.

But while these monetary interventions averted realization of the worst fears at the time by turning the US economy around, they did little to address underlying economic weaknesses, largely due to the ascendance of finance in recent decades at the expense of the real economy. Since then, despite promising to do so, policymakers have not seriously pursued, let alone achieved, such needed reforms.

Instead, ostensible structural reformers have taken advantage of the crisis to pursue largely irrelevant efforts to further ‘casualize’ labour markets. This lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented liquidity central banks injected into economies has not been well allocated to stimulate resurgence of the real economy.

From bust to bubble

Instead, easy credit raised asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. US house prices are now 8% more than at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, while its price-to-earnings ratio in late 2018 was even higher than in 2008 and in 1929, when the Wall Street Crash precipitated the Great Depression.

As monetary tightening checks asset price bubbles, another economic crisis — possibly more severe than the last, as the economy has become less responsive to such blunt monetary interventions — is considered likely. A decade of such unconventional monetary policies, with very low interest rates, has greatly depleted their ability to revive the economy.

The implications beyond the economy of such developments and policy responses are already being seen. Prolonged economic distress has worsened public antipathy towards the culturally alien — not only abroad, but also within. Thus, another round of economic stress is deemed likely to foment unrest, conflict, even war as it is blamed on the foreign.

International trade shrank by two-thirds within half a decade after the US passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, at the start of the Great Depression, ostensibly to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition!

Liberalization’s discontents

Rising economic insecurity, inequalities and deprivation are expected to strengthen ethno-populist and jingoistic nationalist sentiments, and increase social tensions and turmoil, especially among the growing precariat and others who feel vulnerable or threatened.

Thus, ethno-populist inspired chauvinistic nationalism may exacerbate tensions, leading to conflicts and tensions among countries, as in the 1930s. Opportunistic leaders have been blaming such misfortunes on outsiders and may seek to reverse policies associated with the perceived causes, such as ‘globalist’ economic liberalization.

Policies which successfully check such problems may reduce social tensions, as well as the likelihood of social turmoil and conflict, including among countries. However, these may also inadvertently exacerbate problems. The recent spread of anti-globalization sentiment appears correlated to slow, if not negative per capita income growth and increased economic inequality.

To be sure, globalization and liberalization are statistically associated with growing economic inequality and rising ethno-populism. Declining real incomes and growing economic insecurity have apparently strengthened ethno-populism and nationalistic chauvinism, threatening economic liberalization itself, both within and among countries.

Insecurity, populism, conflict

Thomas Piketty has argued that a sudden increase in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Although causality is difficult to prove, with wealth and income inequality now at historical highs, this should give cause for concern.

Of course, other factors also contribute to or exacerbate civil and international tensions, with some due to policies intended for other purposes. Nevertheless, even if unintended, such developments could inadvertently catalyse future crises and conflicts.

Publics often have good reason to be restless, if not angry, but the emotional appeals of ethno-populism and jingoistic nationalism are leading to chauvinistic policy measures which only make things worse.

At the international level, despite the world’s unprecedented and still growing interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed as the US increasingly resorts to unilateral, sovereigntist policies without bothering to even build coalitions with its usual allies.

Avoiding Thucydides’ iceberg

Thus, protracted economic distress, economic conflicts or another financial crisis could lead to military confrontation by the protagonists, even if unintended. Less than a decade after the Great Depression started, the Second World War had begun as the Axis powers challenged the earlier entrenched colonial powers.

They patently ignored Thucydides’ warning, in chronicling the Peloponnesian wars over two millennia before, when the rise of Athens threatened the established dominance of Sparta!

Anticipating and addressing such possibilities may well serve to help avoid otherwise imminent disasters by undertaking pre-emptive collective action, as difficult as that may be.

#### Those wars draw-in great powers---that outweighs.

Lawrence H. Summers 17. US Secretary of the Treasury (1999-2001) and Director of the US National Economic Council (2009-2010), former president of Harvard University, where he is currently University Professor. “Will the Center Hold?” <https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/recession-or-financial-crisis-political-fallout-by-lawrence-h--summers-2017-12?a_la=english&a_d=5a37edac78b6c709b8d260dd&a_m=&a_a=click&a_s=&a_p=%2Fsection%2Feconomics&a_li=recession-or-financial-crisis-political-fallout-by-lawrence-h--summers-2017-12&a_pa=section-commentaries&a_ps>=.

The risk from a purely economic point of view is that the traditional strategy for battling recession – a reduction of 500 basis points in the federal funds rate – will be unavailable this year, given the zero lower bound on interest rates. Nor is it clear that the will or the room for fiscal expansion will exist.

This means that the next recession, like the last, may well be protracted and deep, with severe global consequences. And the political capacity for a global response, like that on display at the London G-20 Summit in 2009, appears to be absent as well. Just compare the global visions of US President Barack Obama and UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown back then with those of Trump and Prime Minister Theresa May today.

I shudder to think what a serious recession will mean for politics and policy. It is hard to imagine avoiding a resurgence of protectionism, populism, and scapegoating. In such a scenario, as with another financial crisis, the center will not hold.

But the greatest risk in the next few years, I believe, is neither a market meltdown nor a recession. It is instead a political doom loop in which voters’ conclusion that government does not work effectively for them becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Candidates elected on platforms of resentment delegitimize the governments they lead, fueling further resentment and even more problematic new leaders. Cynicism pervades.

How else can one explain how the candidacy of Roy Moore for a US Senate seat? Moore, who was twice dismissed for cause from his post on the Alabama Supreme Court, and who is credibly charged with sexually assaulting teenage girls when he was in his 30s, could enter the US Senate as many of his colleagues look the other way.

If a country’s citizens lose confidence in their government’s ability to improve their lives, the government has an incentive to rally popular support by focusing attention on threats that only it can address. That is why in societies pervaded by anger and uncertainty about the future, the temptation to stigmatize minority groups increases. And it is why there is a tendency for officials to magnify foreign threats.

We are seeing this phenomenon all over the world. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Chinese President Xi Jinping have all made nationalism a central part of their governing strategy. So, too, has Trump, who has explicitly rejected the international community in favor of the idea that there is only a ceaseless struggle among nation-states for competitive advantage.

When the world’s preeminent power, having upheld the idea of international community for nearly 75 years, rejects it in favor of ad hoc deal making, others have no choice but to follow suit. Countries that can no longer rely on the US feel pressure to provide for their own security. America’s adversaries inevitably will seek to fill the voids left behind as the US retrenches.

#### Even if growth is imperfect, the transition away fails.

Hubert Buch-Hansen 18. Associate Professor, Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School. “The Prerequisites for a Degrowth Paradigm Shift: Insights from Critical Political Economy.” *Ecological Economics* 146: 157-63. Emory Libraries.

Still, the degrowth project is nowhere near enjoying the degree and type of support it needs if its policies are to be implemented through democratic processes. The number of political parties, labour unions, business associations and international organisations that have so far embraced degrowth is modest to say the least. Economic and political elites, including social democratic parties and most of the trade union movement, are united in the belief that economic growth is necessary and desirable. This consensus finds support in the prevailing type of economic theory and underpins the main contenders in the neoliberal project, such as centre-left and nationalist projects. In spite of the world's multidimensional crisis, a pro-growth discourse in other words continues to be hegemonic: it is widely considered a matter of common sense that continued economic growth is required.

It is also noteworthy that economic and political elites, to a large extent, continue to support the neoliberal project, even in the face of its evident shortcomings. Indeed, the 2008 financial crisis did not result in the weakening of transnational financial capital that could have paved the way for a paradigm shift. Instead of coming to an end, neoliberal capitalism has arguably entered a more authoritarian phase (Bruff, 2014). The main reason the power of the pre-crisis coalition remains intact is that governments stepped in and saved the dominant fraction by means of massive bailouts. It is a foregone conclusion that this fraction and the wider coalition behind the neoliberal paradigm (transnational industrial capital, the middle classes and segments of organized labour) will consider the degrowth paradigm unattractive and that such social forces will vehemently oppose the implementation of degrowth policies (see also Rees, 2014: 97).

While degrowth advocates envision a future in which market forces play a less prominent role than they do today, degrowth is not an antimarket project. As such, it can attract support from certain types of market actors. In particular, it is worth noting that social enterprises, such as cooperatives (Restakis, 2010), play a major role in the degrowth vision. Such enterprises are defined by being ‘organisations involved at least to some extent in the market, with a clear social, cultural and/or environmental purpose, rooted in and serving primarily the local community and ideally having a local and/or democratic ownership structure’ (Johanisova et al., 2013: 11). Social enterprises currently exist at the margins of a system, in which the dominant type of business entity is profit-oriented, shareholder-owned corporations. The further dissemination of social enterprises, which is crucial to the transitions to degrowth societies, is – in many cases – blocked or delayed as a result of the centrifugal forces of global competition (Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2013). Overall, social enterprises thus (still) constitute a social force with modest power.

Ougaard (2016: 467) notes that one of the major dividing lines in the contemporary transnational capitalist class is between capitalists who have a material interest in the carbon-based economy and capitalists who have a material interest in decarbonisation. The latter group, for instance, includes manufacturers of equipment for the production of renewable energy (ibid.: 467). As mentioned above, degrowth advocates have singled out renewable energy as one of the sectors that needs to grow in the future. As such, it seems likely that the owners of national and transnational companies operating in this sector would be more positively inclined towards the degrowth project than would capitalists with a stake in the carbon-based economy. Still, the prospect of the “green sector” emerging as a driving force behind degrowth currently appears meagre. Being under the control of transnational capital (Harris, 2010), such companies generally embrace the “green growth” discourse, which ‘is deeply embedded in neoliberal capitalism’ and indeed serves to adjust this form of capitalism ‘to crises arising from contradictions within itself’ (Wanner, 2015: 23).

In addition to support from the social forces engendered by the production process, a political project ‘also needs the political ability to mobilize majorities in parliamentary democracies, and a sufficient measure of at least passive consent’ (van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012: 5–6) if it is to become hegemonic. As mentioned, degrowth enjoys little support in parliaments, and certainly the pro-growth discourse is hegemonic among parties in government.5 With capital accumulation being the most important driving force in capitalist societies, political decision-makers are generally eager to create conditions conducive to production and the accumulation of capital (Lindblom, 1977: 172). Capitalist states and international organisations are thus “programmed” to facilitate capital accumulation, and do as such constitute a strategically selective terrain that works to the disadvantage of the degrowth project.

The main advocates of the degrowth project are grassroots, small fractions of left-wing parties and labour unions as well as academics and other citizens who are concerned about social injustice and the environmentally unsustainable nature of societies in the rich parts of the world. The project is thus ideationally driven in the sense that support for it is not so much rooted in the material circumstances or short-term self-interests of specific groups or classes as it is rooted in the conviction that degrowth is necessary if current and future generations across the globe are to be able to lead a good life. While there is no shortage of enthusiasts and creative ideas in the degrowth movement, it has only modest resources compared to other political projects. To put it bluntly, the advocates of degrowth do not possess instruments that enable them to force political decision-makers to listen to – let alone comply with – their views. As such, they are in a weaker position than the labour union movement was in its heyday, and they are in a far weaker position than the owners and managers of large corporations are today (on the structural power of transnational corporations, see Gill and Law, 1989).

6. Consent

It is also safe to say that degrowth enjoys no “passive consent” from the majority of the population. For the time being, degrowth remains unknown to most people. Yet, if it were to become generally known, most people would probably not find the vision of a smaller economic system appealing. This is not just a matter of degrowth being ‘a missile word that backfires’ because it triggers negative feelings in people when they first hear it (Drews and Antal, 2016). It is also a matter of the actual content of the degrowth project.

Two issues in particular should be mentioned in this context. First, for many, the anti-capitalist sentiments embodied in the degrowth project will inevitably be a difficult pill to swallow. Today, the vast majority of people find it almost impossible to conceive of a world without capitalism. There is a ‘widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible to even imagine a coherent alternative to it’ (Fisher, 2009: 2). As Jameson (2003) famously observed, it is, in a sense, easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism. However, not only is degrowth – like other anti-capitalist projects – up against the challenge that most people consider capitalism the only system that can function; it is also up against the additional challenge that it speaks against economic growth in a world where the desirability of growth is considered common sense.

Second, degrowth is incompatible with the lifestyles to which many of us who live in rich countries have become accustomed. Economic growth in the Western world is, to no small extent, premised on the existence of consumer societies and an associated consumer culture most of us find it difficult to completely escape. In this culture, social status, happiness, well-being and identity are linked to consumption (Jackson, 2009). Indeed, it is widely considered a natural right to lead an environmentally unsustainable lifestyle – a lifestyle that includes car ownership, air travel, spacious accommodations, fashionable clothing, an omnivorous diet and all sorts of electronic gadgets. This Western norm of consumption has increasingly been exported to other parts of the world, the result being that never before have so many people taken part in consumption patterns that used to be reserved for elites (Koch, 2012). If degrowth were to be institutionalised, many citizens in the rich countries would have to adapt to a materially lower standard of living. That is, while the basic needs of the global population can be met in a non-growing economy, not all wants and preferences can be fulfilled (Koch et al., 2017). Undoubtedly, many people in the rich countries would experience various limitations on their consumption opportunities as a violent encroachment on their personal freedom. Indeed, whereas many recognize that contemporary consumer societies are environmentally unsustainable, fewer are prepared to actually change their own lifestyles to reverse/address this.

At present, then, the degrowth project is in its “deconstructive phase”, i.e., the phase in which its advocates are able to present a powerful critique of the prevailing neoliberal project and point to alternative solutions to crisis. At this stage, not enough support has been mobilised behind the degrowth project for it to be elevated to the phases of “construction” and “consolidation”. It is conceivable that at some point, enough people will become sufficiently discontent with the existing economic system and push for something radically different. Reasons for doing so could be the failure of the system to satisfy human needs and/or its inability to resolve the multidimensional crisis confronting humanity. Yet, various material and ideational path-dependencies currently stand in the way of such a development, particularly in countries with large middle-classes. Even if it were to happen that the majority wanted a break with the current system, it is far from given that a system based on the ideas of degrowth is what they would demand.

#### Scenario 2 is Innovation:

#### Increased competition aligns innovation with profit motive and drives technological breakthroughs in every sector of the economy.

Giulio Federico 20. Head of the Unit at the Chief Economist Team (CET) of DG Competition, European Commission, et al., 2020. “Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming and Protecting Disruption.” https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Shapiro-Carl-Antitrust-and-Innovation-Welcoming-and-Protecting-Disruption.pdf.

The goal of antitrust policy is to protect and promote a vigorous competitive process. Effective rivalry spurs firms to introduce new and innovative products, as they seek to capture profitable sales from their competitors and to protect their existing sales from future challengers. In this fundamental way, competition promotes innovation. We apply this basic insight to the antitrust treatment of horizontal mergers and of exclusionary conduct by dominant firms. A merger between rivals internalizes business-stealing effects arising from their parallel innovation efforts and thus tends to depress innovation incentives. Merger-specific synergies, such as the internalization of involuntary spillovers or an increase in the productivity of R&D, may offset the adverse effect of a merger on innovation. We describe the possible effects of a merger on innovation by developing a taxonomy of cases, with reference to recent US and EU examples. A dominant firm may engage in exclusionary conduct to eliminate the threat from disruptive firms. This suppresses innovation by foreclosing disruptive rivals and by reducing the pressure to innovative on the incumbent. We apply this broad principle to possible exclusionary strategies by dominant firms.

I. Introduction

We write in praise of market disrupters—firms that shake up the status quo, threaten incumbent firms, and sometimes transform entire industries. Through this process, which Joseph Schumpeter famously called “creative destruction,” disruptive firms promote economic growth and bring the benefits of new technologies and new business practices and business models to consumers.

We focus on the impact of antitrust policy—known globally as competition policy—on innovation.1 Competition policy seeks to protect and promote a vigorous competitive process by which new ideas are transformed into realized consumer benefits. In this fundamental way, competition spurs innovation. The productivity and growth literature teach us that innovation is the primary driver of rising standards of living over time, so promoting innovation through effective competition policy is likely to be very consequential for economic growth and welfare.

Disruptive firms drive a significant amount of innovation.2 They do not use the same technology or business model as incumbents. They offer consumers a distinct value proposition, not simply lower prices. By making its offer to customers attractive in a new way, a disruptive firm can destroy a great deal of incumbent profit while creating a large amount of consumer surplus. The resulting churn in products and market shares, as new products enter and old ones exit, and as newer business methods and business models supplant older ones, represents a healthy competitive process. If that competitive process is slowed or biased by mergers or by exclusionary conduct, innovation is lessened and consumers are harmed. This same competitive process promotes the development and diffusion of best practices, including what might be termed reductions in X-inefficiency. The trade and productivity literature both convincingly demonstrate that firms vary significantly in their productivity levels and that stiffer competition reallocates sales to more productive firms. The diffusion of best practices also is promoted if sales are contestable, going to the better-performing firms.

Competition policy seeks to protect the competitive process by which disruptive firms challenge the status quo. Competition policy is agnostic regarding the type of firm or the type of innovation involved. Start-ups that grow rapidly can certainly be disruptive. Uber and Airbnb are prominent recent examples. But large established firms can also be disruptive, especially when they attack adjacent markets. Think of Walmart entering local retail markets, Microsoft Bing challenging Google in search, or Netflix producing its own video content.

In contrast, the role played by successful incumbent firms in their own core markets is deeply conflicted. On the one hand, process innovations that lower costs can be most valuable at the largest firms, and market leaders often invest substantial sums to introduce new generations of products. Examples abound: Intel developing a new generation of technology and building new fabs to manufacture microprocessors; Boeing developing a new generation of large commercial aircraft; and Verizon investing to build its 5G wireless network. In many industries experiencing rapid technological change, the biggest firms are also some of the most impressive innovators, as Schumpeter observed 75 years ago.3 This should not be surprising, given the economies of scale associated with R&D, especially in industries where developing the next-generation product or process requires investments of hundreds of millions of dollars and/or extensive experience with the current technology.4 On the other hand, a successful incumbent firm that is profiting greatly from the status quo has a powerful incentive to preserve those profits, and this can mean slowing down or blocking disruptive threats. Successful incumbents also may find it very difficult organizationally to invest in disruptive technologies. 5 Competition valuably increases the diversity of approaches taken to the development of new technology.

We stress in this article that innovation is best promoted when market leaders are allowed to exploit their competitive advantages while also facing pressure to perform coming from both conventional rivals and from disruptive entrants. These labels depend on context: the same firm can be a market leader in one area and a disruptive upstart in another. Market leaders may face competitive pressures to innovate coming from (a) other large firms in the same market, (b) other large firms in adjacent spaces, or (c) smaller, pesky disruptive firms. Casual empiricism indicates that all of these sources of competition are important in different settings. All have historically been protected using competition policy.

The central theme animating our analysis is that a market leader is best motivated to innovate if it fears losing its leadership position to a disruptive rival.6 Even a dominant incumbent will feel pressure to innovate if the bulk of tomorrow’s sales will be won by the firm that is most innovative, be that the incumbent or a disruptive challenger, and if other firms are in a position to leapfrog the current incumbent. Once one properly understands the dynamic nature of the competitive process, it becomes clear that greater rivalry—meaning greater contestability of tomorrow’s sales—leads to more innovation.7 The critical role of competition policy is thus to prevent today’s market leaders from using their market power to disable disruptive threats, either by acquiring would-be rivals or by using anticompetitive tactics to exclude them. Sections II and III discuss the treatment of horizontal mergers that may harm innovation. Section IV discusses the antitrust limits on the business conduct of dominant incumbent firms.

#### Expanding antitrust is necessary to sustain creative destruction. Only that preserves innovation leadership.

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The goal underpinning U.S. antitrust law is to promote competition that leads to lower prices and enhanced consumer welfare.

For years, antitrust agencies have approached this goal by focusing on short-term, static competition, which emphasizes achieving low prices in the here and now.

This narrow focus, however, has resulted in unnecessary conflict between the static competitive analysis deployed by antitrust regulators and the dynamic issues raised by intellectual property.

Fortunately, over the last few decades, a growing recognition has emerged among economists that antitrust laws must be recalibrated to preserve the incentive to innovate and promote the U.S. innovation economy.

These economists are calling for an antitrust framework that prioritizes dynamic over static competition — placing less weight on market concentration in the assessment of market power and more weight on assessing technological opportunity, innovation-driven competition and appropriate enterprise-level capabilities.

At the heart of this movement is the foundational principle, dating back to Joseph Schumpeter and Nobel Laureate economist Robert Solow, that innovation is the main driver of economic growth.

Indeed, given the strong economic evidence that innovation drives productivity, sharpens competition and creates new products, a serious consumer-oriented antitrust policy, with an intermediate-to-long-term orientation, necessarily must focus primarily on supporting and advancing innovation.

However, although antitrust agencies routinely claim to favor both innovation and competition, this has not always been the case.

For instance, during the previous administration, some agency heads unnecessarily generated tension between static competitive analysis — with its undue emphasis on achieving low prices in the short term — and the dynamic issues implicated by intellectual property and associated royalty payments.

Royalties, in the short run, raise prices of licensed goods relative to the prices that would prevail absent payments.

However, payments to licensors also support innovation by helping innovators achieve the economic returns necessary to draw forth the critical investment dollars needed to support research and development (R&D) and continuing innovation.

This model produces a continuous cycle of innovation in which innovators are properly incentivized to invent and reinvest their royalties into more R&D, which leads to new innovations and restarts the cycle.

A prime example of the dynamic benefits flowing from such an innovation ecosystem is 5G. This revolutionary technology promises the ability to connect to and control cities, automobiles, objects and devices, transforming a broad range of industries in the process.

Thanks to its private-sector top performers, the United States currently leads the world in 5G — a distinction that comes with an extraordinary opportunity for massive economic growth and increased consumer welfare.

However, the rigid application of an antitrust framework focused on short-term pricing, rather than on innovation as a critical driver of competition, could cause the United States to forfeit its 5G leadership position.

This would not only reduce consumer welfare but would pose a clear risk to U.S. national security — a fact recognized by U.S. national defense agencies in prohibiting a foreign company from acquiring Qualcomm, a U.S. technology company, because the proposed transaction imperiled Qualcomm’s 5G leadership position.

Recently, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has indicated that a course correction may be underway. In a series of speeches, Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim, head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, signaled that the focus of a sound antitrust analysis must be less on short-term pricing and more on the innovation and growth that delivers value to consumers over the longer term.

For example, in his speech before the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, Delrahim invoked “promoting dynamic competition” as a normative goal of competition regulators.

He also declared that “competition law enforcers around the world must give careful consideration to the interests that drive innovation, including by allowing innovators to reap the full rewards of their investment in research and development.” It appears that Delrahim correctly recognizes that innovation is the critical driver of competition.

While Delrahim’s leadership on this issue is admirable, officials at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regrettably have yet to follow the DOJ’s lead. The FTC continues to endorse outdated modes of competition regulation and policies that are not properly calibrated to promote dynamic competition and advance innovation.

In order to truly enhance consumer welfare over the long term, I hope the FTC soon will join hands with the DOJ and help move the United States toward a pro-innovation policy founded upon a dynamic competition paradigm.

For over 30 years, a small group of economists has been calling for a pivot in antitrust in favor of dynamic over static competition. With Delrahim at the helm of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, we may soon witness such a pivot.

U.S. antitrust policy needs to adopt a deeper understanding of innovation processes and competition over the long run, and there needs to be greater policy coherence among antitrust, industrial and technology policies.

The dynamic competition paradigm is both the easiest and the best intellectual paradigm for the competition agencies and the courts to employ to free antitrust from its current outmoded framework. Indeed, prioritizing dynamic competition over its weaker sibling will enhance not just consumer welfare, but economic welfare, too.

#### Innovation is key to leadership and competitiveness.

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First, how will the United States respond to the ongoing transformation of the domestic and international economy? Economic success going forward will be less based on traditional measures and low value-added activities, such as agriculture, resource extraction, low-end services, and even mass industrial prowess. Growth will increasingly emerge from generating and implementing technological innovations, as well as from the ability to creatively finance them. New technological breakthroughs in AI and machine learning, quantum computing, automation and robotics, 3D printing and advanced manufacturing, biomedicine, nanotechnology, etc. have the potential to revolutionize fields ranging from energy and health to manufacturing and transportation. Will the United States generate and adapt to these innovations, while also providing its population with the skills necessary to thrive in this new world? Success in the technology and financial realm have also tended to increase inequality, while also worsening geographical divisions between innovation hubs (Boston, San Francisco, New York, Austin) and other parts of the country. Will the government devise wise policies to ameliorate these frictions without losing the benefits of innovation?

How this question is answered is largely a matter of domestic politics. Yet how it is answered will shape both America’s global competitiveness and its political and societal well-being.

Relatedly, will the United States reject globalization and turn inward? In many communities, intense globalization is associated with de-industrialization and offshoring, despair and the opioid crisis, debt and inequality, climate change, and the rise of China. The United States has, throughout its history, gone through periods where it has turned its gaze away from the international economy. These historical episodes have rarely ended happily. Is there a way to capture the benefits of globalization while minimizing the harmful excesses?

The third question concerns the future of America’s economic relationship to China. The argument for decoupling and reducing vulnerability to China is powerful. First, COVID-19 demonstrated the dangers of vulnerable supply chains. Second, it does not make sense to continue to enrich a current and future rival. Third, increasing automation and robotics means that labor cost differentials are a less compelling reason to offshore production. For those who are skeptical of the pacifying effects of interdependence and believe security concerns should always trump economic ones, pulling away from China’s economy is the obvious choice.

The problem is that left to its own devices, the American and Chinese economies won’t naturally decouple. General Motors sells more cars, and Apple has sold more iPhones, in China than in the United States. Supply chains remain deeply integrated, including on the high-end technology front. Dissolving those relationships will be costly. Trade today is less between countries than within firms, whose operations are global rather than national. Shared technology platforms increase productivity, which would be lost under decoupling.

Trade flows, however, do not begin to capture the deep integration between the two economies. The financial and monetary spheres are far more interconnected. Chinese companies are raising record amounts on Wall Street, while U.S. banks and financial firms increase their investment and business in China. Despite political strains over the past decade, direct investment and financing in both directions shows little signs of decreasing. Reversing economic interdependence — if that policy is chosen for national security purposes — will both be costly and require political will. It would also fully signal that the United States sees China not as a competitor or even a rival, but as a full-blown adversary.

What are the sources of innovation and adaptation, and what role will the national government play in facilitating creating, scaling up, and implementing new technologies? This is the fourth big question faced by the Biden administration, and the issue here will be shaped by its view of U.S. competition and antitrust policy. On the one hand, the recent computing and telecommunications revolution has revealed the power of companies that dominate networks and platforms. The United States has done very well in this new world, and there are important arguments that the government should applaud and support the success of American tech giants dominating the global economy. On the other hand, some experts question whether it is healthy from a competition, innovation, and fairness perspective to allow companies like Amazon, Apple, Google, and Microsoft to achieve such dominating market power. They harken back to the spirit of President Theodore Roosevelt and his controversial but popular program of trust-busting in the early 20th century. There are critical national security considerations to both views.

Relatedly, there is a long-debated question of the role the government should play in seeding, supporting, subsidizing, and even directing the private sector. The United States has long steered clear of national economic planning. Yet the Chinese government’s massive, directed investments and championing of its companies, both for economic and national security reasons, has caused many Americans to rethink their priors on the relationship between the state and the private sector. This is reflected in the impressive, bipartisan support for the Endless Frontier Act to support improved technological competitiveness vis-à-vis China.

The final question involves America’s role as the banker to the world. Will the United States continue in this role, and what will the consequences be? This question has two parts, the first involving international monetary policy, the second surrounding capital formation.

One of the most important global economic developments of the past 15 years has been the emergence of the Federal Reserve Bank as the lender of last resort, not just to the United States, but to the world. The Federal Reserve banking system demonstrated masterful adaptability and far-sighted innovation during both the 2008 financial crisis and the economic fallout from last year’s COVID-19 crisis that, in both cases, arguably prevented a global depression and increased its mandate well beyond securing the U.S. financial system. In the process, it quietly but significantly increased America’s already potent global monetary and financial power. Despite previous predictions to the contrary, it is and will remain for some time a dollar-dominated world. Will this increased monetary power marry up with America’s recent proclivity to deploy economic sanctions, and if so, will that add or diminish American economic influence over the long term?

Part of the answer will be shaped by the uncertain outcome of current economic policies. The United States is currently undergoing a consequential experiment, with relative loose fiscal and monetary policy leading to a rethinking of how much debt and liquidity the economy can contain. Will this produce destabilizing inflation and a return to 1970s stagflation? Or will this liquidity be efficiently absorbed into higher productivity, a reduction in inequality, and overall growth? Interest rates, both nationally and around the world, remain near historical lows, despite the surge in liquidity.

The second aspect to America’s global financial power comes in its world leading innovation, sophistication, and depth of its financial sector. In recent decades, New York City competed with Hong Kong and London as the best place to raise capital and list companies. As recently as a decade ago, New York’s competitors showed signs of taking the lead. Great Britain’s decision to leave the European Union and China’s decision to crack down on dissent in Hong Kong has moved the advantages back to the United States. In addition to the traditional methods of Wall Street finance and exchange listings, America’s innovative venture capital financing capabilities in Silicon Valley, Boston, Austin, and elsewhere provide important and impressive domestic and global advantages. Can they be maintained and expanded upon?

#### Regulated capitalism is key---alternative systems fail to innovate sufficiently.

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Nonetheless, the abolition of capitalism is not the solution. The last century witnessed a large-scale experiment with an alternative system—a system of central planning in the Soviet Union and other communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This system failed to offer individuals the freedom and economic incentives necessary for frontier innovation, and so these nations were unable to get beyond an intermediate level of development. Henri Weber, a well-known figure of the French movement of May 1968, was a former Trotskyist leader in the 1960s and 1970s but later became a leader of the French Socialist Party and Socialist member of the European Parliament. He explained his personal conversion to the free market economy and social democracy, looking to the Scandinavian experience: “Having witnessed from a front-row seat the disaster of collectivization of agriculture and firms in the Soviet Union, the Scandinavian Socialists were the first to break with the dogma of socializing means of production and managing the economy by a central planning committee. To control and humanize the economy, it is altogether unnecessary to expropriate management, to nationalize firms, or to eradicate the market . . . altogether unnecessary to deprive society of the creativity, knowhow, and dynamism of entrepreneurs. Under certain conditions, entrepreneurial talent can be mobilized to serve the common good.” A market economy, because it induces creative destruction, is inherently disruptive. But historically it has proved to be a formidable engine of prosperity, hoisting our societies to levels of development unimaginable two centuries ago. Must we therefore resign ourselves to the serious pitfalls and defects of capitalism as the necessary price to pay to generate prosperity and overcome poverty?

In this book, we have sought to better understand how growth through creative destruction interacts with competition, inequality, the environment, finance, unemployment, health, happiness, and industrialization, and how poor countries catch up to rich ones. We have analyzed to what degree the state, with appropriate control of the executive, can stimulate the creation of wealth while at the same time tackling the problems mentioned above. We have seen how, by moving from laissez-faire capitalism, with market forces given free rein, to a form of capitalism in which the state and civil society play their full role, it is possible to stimulate social mobility and reduce inequality without discouraging innovation. We have also seen how appropriate competition policies can curb the decline of growth and how we can redirect innovation toward green technologies to combat global warming. We have seen that, without forgoing globalization, a country can improve its competitiveness through innovative investments and put in place effective safety nets to protect individuals who lose their jobs. Lastly, we have seen how, with the indispensable support of civil society, it is possible to prevent yesterday’s innovators, in collusion with public officials, from pulling up the ladder behind themselves to block the path of tomorrow’s innovators.

#### Failure to sustain innovation leadership makes a China war inevitable.

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The global economy has become more integrated, with China’s economy growing strongly—poised to soon take over the United States at market exchange rates and having already done so in terms of purchasing power parity. More importantly, China has become the top trading partner and creditor/investor for many countries. The size and penetration of the Chinese economy have rendered a strategy of containing China impractical and costly to all sides, and makes the US-China contention more protracted and difficult.

The West thus faces a dilemma: Efforts to decouple from China in order to limit its influence would hurt not only China but also Western countries and the global economy more broadly, but striking a trade deal with China to reduce tensions will likely help the Chinese economy perform better, making the strategic competition with Beijing more intractable.

The rivalry has slowly led to a bifurcation of the global economy, most discernible in high-tech areas such as the tension between digital authoritarianism and digital liberalism, artificial intelligence and surveillance technologies, satellite-based navigation for civilian and military uses, and 5G/6G telecommunications.

A balanced assessment

It’s important to remember that China has many weaknesses, including an aging population with a shrunken labor force, a secular decline in labor productivity, high levels of debt, environmental degradation, and social and economic inequalities. It is still an open question whether China can graduate from its old and trusted development model of mobilizing massive investment for exports to one driven by innovation—a model that tends not to thrive under political control.

However, it is equally important not to underestimate the domestic challenges facing the United States and several European countries. Confronted by aging populations and declining productivity, many affluent Western countries have been beset by populist backlashes against economic inequalities and social problems. Especially in the United States, the division has deepened to the extent that there is no shared perception of reality, let alone common ground for debate. This makes it difficult for the United States to build political consensus behind any sustained actions needed to deal with its challenges—even though the country has managed to overcome difficulties in the past and could do so again.

With or without the label “cold war,” the United States and China are locked in a protracted conflict over core national values, including economic and geopolitical interests. The fact that the Chinese economy is stronger than the Soviet Union’s decrepit economy, playing a key role in integrated global supply chains, while many Western countries suffer from internal divisions, makes the strategic competition more challenging for the West than the Cold War of the late twentieth century was. Of particular concern is the fact that the United States has suffered a steep fall in its Freedom House “Freedom in the World” score since 2010, denting much of its soft power. Consequently, the contestants in today’s conflict appear to be more evenly matched, making for a difficult struggle ahead—whatever you want to call it.

#### US-China competition isn’t defined by military strength, but relative innovation capacity. Outpacing China is the only way to prevent a war.

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The United States and China are in a growing competition, perhaps verging on conflict, but it is not a nineteenth century competition between empires for control of territory and resources. Unlike great power competition in previous centuries, the focal point is not military strength or territorial expansion. This conflict is over control of the modern levers of power—global rules and institutions, standards, trade, and technology. The ability to create new technologies, particularly digital technologies (given their importance for politics, security, and economic growth) have become key factors in the U.S.-China relationship, which is marked by close commercial cooperation and deep governmental distrust. This disparity creates unavoidable tensions.

The link between technology, innovation, national security, and international power is now widely recognized. When Vladimir Putin says that the country that leads in artificial intelligence (AI) “will be the ruler of the world,” it is hyperbole, but hyperbole that confirms that political leaders recognize that the ability to innovate is a potent source of national power. In the digital age, national security and national power have different requirements shaped by technological change and cyberspace.

Innovation has become a central element of its international influence. This is not new—the U.S.-Soviet space race was a contest of the ability of different systems to produce new technologies, but those were unique government programs. Technological competition today is as much between companies as states. A country’s ability to innovate and produce advanced technologies provides economic strength, military power, and an intangible benefit of perceived leadership.

Both China and the United States have advantages and disadvantages in this contest, and while it is usual to focus on quantitative aspects—such as the number of engineers or patents and spending on research and development (R&D)—these are not the key determinants of technological competition between states. This competition is a contest of ideas on governance for investment, innovation, and the internet. The internet and global connectivity not only reshape the environment for competition but also create political and market forces that both nations find difficult to control.

#### That goes nuclear.

Graham Allison 17. American political scientist and professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?” Scribe Publications Pty Limited.

Two centuries ago, Napoleon warned, "Let China sleep; when she wakes, she will shake the world." Today China has awakened, and the world is beginning to shake. Yet many Americans are still in denial about what China's transfor- mation from agrarian backwater to "the biggest player in the history of the world" means for the United States. What is this book's Big Idea? In a phrase. Thucydidess Trap; When rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, alarm bells should sound: danger ahead. China and the United States are currently on a collision course for war-unless both parties take difficult and painful actions to avert it. As a rapidly ascending China challenges America's accustomed pre- dominance, these two nations risk falling into a deadly trap first identified the 'ancient' Greek historian Thucydides. Writing about a war that devastated the two leading city-states of classical Greece two and a half. millennia ago, he explained: "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable." That primal insight describes :1 perilous historical pattern. Reviewing the record of the past five hundred years, the Thucydides's Trap Project I direct at Harvard has found sixteen cases in which a major nation's rise has disrupted the position of a dominant state. In the most infamous example, an industrial Germany rattled Britain's established position at the top of the pecking order a century ago. The catastrophic outcome of their competition necessitated a new category of violent conflict: world war. Our research finds that twelve of these rivalries ended in war and four did not - not a comforting ratio for the twenty- first century's most important geopolitical contest. This is not a book about China. It is about the *impact* of a rising China on the US and the global order. For seven decades since World War II, a rules-based framework led by Washington has defined world order, producing an era without war among great powers. Most people now think of this as normal. Historians call it a rare "Long Peace." To- day, an increasingly powerful China is unraveling this order, throwing into question the peace generations have taken for granted. In 2015, the Atlantic published "The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China headed for War?" In that essay I argued that this histori- cal metaphor provides the best lens available for illuminating relations between China and the US today. Since then, the concept has ignited considerable debate. Rather than face the evidence and reflect on the uncomfortable but necessary adjustments both sides might make, pol- icy wonlts and presidents alike have constructed a straw man around Thucydides's claim about "inevitability." They have then put a torch to it -arguing that war between Washington and Beijing is not predetermined. At their 2015 summit, Presidents Barack Obama and Xijinping discussed the Trap at length. Obama emphasized that despite the structural stress created by China's rise. "the two countries are capable of managing their disagreements." At the same time, they acknowledged that. in Xi's words. "should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves." I concur: war between the US and China is not inevitable. Indeed, Thucydides would agree that neither was war between Athens and Sparta. Read in context. it is clear that he meant his claim about inevitability as hyperbole: exaggeration for the purpose of emphasis. The point of Thucydides's Trap is neither fatalism nor pessimism. Instead. it points us beyond the headlines and regime rhetoric to recognize the tectonic structural stress that Beijing and Washington must master to construct a peaceful relationship. If Hollywood were making a movie pitting China against the United States on the path to war. central casting could not find two better leading actors than Xi jinping and Donald Trump. Each personifies his country's deep aspirations of national greatness. Much as Xi's appointment as leader (if China in 2012 accentuated the role of the rising power, America': election of Donald Trump in a campaign that vilified China promises a more vigorous response from the ruling power. As personalities, Trump and Xi could not be more different. As protagonists in a struggle to be number one. however, they share por- tentous similarities. Both - Are driven by .1 common ambition: to malte their nation great again. - Identify the nation ruled by the other as the principal obstacle to their dream. - Take pride in their own unique leadership capabilities. ' See themselves playing a central role in revitalizing their nation. ° Have announced daunting domestic agendas that call for radical changes. - Have fired up populist nationalist support to "drain the swamp" of corruption at home and confront attempts by each other to thwart their nation's historic mission. Will the impending clash between these two great nations lead to war? Will Presidents Trump and Xi, or their successors. follow in the tragic footsteps of the leaders of Athens and Sparta or Britain and Ger- many? Or will they find a way to avoid war as effectively as Britain and the US did a century ago or the US and the Soviet Union did through four decades of Cold War? Obviously, no one knows. We can be cer- tain, however, that the dynamic Thucydides identified will intensify in the years ahead. Denying Thucydides’s Trap does not make it less real. Recognizing it does not mean just accepting whatever happens. We owe it to future generations to face one of history’s most brutal tendencies head on and then do everything we can to defy the odds. h, if we only knew." That was the best the Gemian chancellor could offer. Even when a colleague pressed Theobald von Beth- mann Hollweg. he could not explain how his choices. and those of other European statesmen, had led to the most devastating war the world had seen to that point. By the time the slaughter of the Great War finally ended in 1918, the key players had lost all they fought for: the Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved. the German kaiser ousted, the Russian tsar overthrown, France bled for a generation, and England shorn of its treasure and youth. And for what? If we only knew. Bethmann Hollweg's phrase haunted the president of the United States nearly half a century later. In 1962.]ohn F. Kennedy was forty- five years old and in his second year in oï¬‚ice, but still struggling to get his mind around his responsibilities commander in chief. He knew that his finger was on the button of a nuclear arsenal that could ltill hundreds of millions of human beings in a matter of minutes. But for what? A slogan at the time declared. "Better dead than red." Kennedy rejected that dichotomy as not just facile, but false. "Our goal," as he put it, had to be "not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom." The question was how he and his administration could achieve both. As he vacationecl at the family compound on Cape Cod in the sum- mer of 1902, Kennedy found himself reading The Gun: q/'August, Bar- bara Tuchman's compelling account of the outbrealt of war in 1914. Tuclnnan traced the thoughts and actions of Germany's Kaiser Wil- helm and his chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. Britain's King George and his foreign secretary Edward Grey, Tsar Nicholas, Austro-Hungarian emperor Franz Joseph. and others as they sleepwalked into the abyss. Tuchman argued that none of these men understood the danger they faced. None wanted the war they got. Given the opportunity for a do- -mwm he made. Reflecting on his own responsibilities, Kennedy pledged that if he ever found himself facing his own responsibilities, Kennedy pledged that if ever found himself facing choices that could make the difference between catastrophic war and peace, he would be able to give history a better answer than Bethmann Holloweg’s. Kennedy had no inkling of what lay ahead. In October 1962, just two months after he read Tuchman's book, he faced off against Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in the most dangerous confrontation in hu- man history. The Cuban Missile Crisis began when the United States discovered the Soviets attempting to sneak nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba, a mere ninety miles from Florida. The situation quickly esca- lated from diplomatic threats to an American blockade of the island, military mobilizations in both the US and USSR, and several high- stakes clashes. including the shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane over Cuba. At the height of the crisis, which lasted for a tense thirteen days. Kennedy confided to his brother Robert that he believed the chances it would end in nuclear war were "between one-in-three and even." Nothing historians have discovered since has lengthened ' those odds. Although he appreciated the dangers of his predicament. Kennedy repeatedly made choices he knew actually increased the risk of war, in- cluding nuclear war. He chose to confront Khrushchev publicly (rather than my to resolve the issue privately through diplomatic channels); to draw an unambiguous red line requiring the removal of Soviet missiles (rather than leave himself more wiggle room); to threaten air strikes to destroy the missiles (knowing this could trigger Soviet retaliation against Berlin); and finally, on the penultimate day of the crisis. to give Khrushchev a time-limited ultimatum (that. if rejected. would have re- quired the US to fire the first shot). In each of these choices, Kennedy understood that he was raising the risk that further events and choices by others beyond his control could lead to nuclear bombs destroying American cities. including Washing- ton, DC (where his family stayed throughout the ordeal). For example, when Kennedy elevated the alert level of the American nuclear arse- nal to Defcon II. he made US weapons less vulnerable to a preemptive Soviet attack but simultaneously relaxed a score of safety catches. At Defcon ll. German and Turkish pilots took their seats in NATO fighter bombers loaded with armed nuclear weapons less than two hours away from their targets in the Soviet Union. Since electronic locks on nu- clm weapons had not yet been invented, there was no physical or tech- nica barrier preventing a pilot from deciding to ï¬‚y to Moscow, drop a mic ar bomb, and start World War III. ith no way to wish away these "risks of the uncontrollable," Ken- ned ' and his secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, reached deeply into organizational procedures to minimize accidents or mistakes. De- spit those efforts, historians have identified more than a dozen close calls outside Kennedy's span of control that could have sparked a war. A US ntisubmarine campaign, For example, dropped explosives around Soviet submarines to force them to surface, leading a Soviet captain to believe he was under attack and almost fire his nuclear-armed torpe- does. In another incident, the pilot of a U-2 spy craft mistakenly ï¬‚ew over the Soviet Union, causing Khrushchev to fear that Washington was refining coordinates for a preemptive nuclear attack. If one of these actions had sparked a nuclear World War III. could\_]FK explain how his choices contributed to it? Could he give a better answer to an inquisi- tor's question than Bethmann Hollweg did? The complexity of causation in human affairs has vexed philoso- phers, jurists, and social scientists. In analyzing how wars break out, historians focus primarily on proximate or immediate causes. In the case of World War I, these include the assassination of the Hapsburg archduke Franz Ferdinand and the decision by Tsar Nicholas II to mo- bilize Russian forces against the Central Powers. If the Cuban Missile Crisis had resulted in war, the proximate causes could have been the Soviet submarine captain's decision to fire his torpedoes rather than al- low his submarine to sink, or a Turkish pilot's errant choice to fly his nuclear payload to Moscow. Proximate causes for war are undeniably important. But the founder of history believed that the most obvious causes for bloodshed mask even more significant ones. More import- ant than the sparks that lead to war, Thucydides teaches us, are the structural factors that lay its foundations: conditions in which other- wise manageable events can escalate with unforeseeable severity and produce unimaginable consequences. Tl-IUCYDIDES'S TRAP In the most frequently cited one-liner in the study of international re- lations, the ancient Greek historian Thucydides explained, "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war a} . I I .99 Tliucydides wrote about the Peloponnesian War, a conflict that en- gulfcd his homeland, the city-state of Athens, in the fifth century BCB, and which in time came to consume almost the entirety of ancient Greece. A former soldier. Thucydides watched as Athens challenged the dominant Greek power of the day, the martial city-state of Sparta. He observed the outbreak of armed hostilities between the two powers and detailed the fighting's horrific toll. He did not live to see its bitter end. when a weakened Sparta finally vanquished Athens. but it is just as well for him. While others identified an array of contributing causes of the Pelo- ponncsian War. Thucydides went to the heart of the matter. When he turned the spotlight on "the rise of Athens and the fear that this in- stilled in Sparta." he identified a primary driver at the root of some of history's most catastrophic and puzzling wars. Intentions aside, when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash the rule, not the exception. It happened between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century ncia, between Germany and Britain a century ago. and almost led to war between the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1950s and 19605. Like so many others. Athens believed its advance to be benign. Over the half century that preceded the conï¬‚ict, it had emerged as a steeple of civilization. Philosophy, drama. architecture, democracy. history, and naval prowess-Athens had it all. beyond anything previously -s'eel'I'Imder the sun. Its rapid development began to threaten Sparta, which had grown accustomed to its position as the dominant power on the Peloponnese. As Athenian confidence and pride grew, so too did its demands for respect and expectations that arrangements be revised to reflect new realities of power. These were, Thucydides tells us, natural reactions to its changing station. How could Athenians not believe that their interests deserved more weight? How could Athenians not expect that they should have greater inï¬‚uence in resolving differences? But it was also natural. Thucydides explained. that Spartans should see the Athenian claims as unreasonable, and even ungrateful. Who, Spartans rightly asked. provided the security environment that allowed Athens to ï¬‚ourish? As Athens swelled with a growing sense of its own importance, and felt entitled to greater say and sway, Sparta reacted with insecurity. fear. and a determination to defend the status quo. Similar dynamics can be found in a host of other settings, indeed even in families. When a young man's adolescent surge poses the prospect that he will overshadow his older sibling (or even his father), what do we expect? Should the allocation of bedrooms. or closet space, or seat- ing be adjusted to reflect relative size as well as age? In alpha-dominated species like gorillas, as a potential successor grows larger and stronger, both the pack leader and the wannabe prepare for a showdown. In businesses, when disruptive technologies allow upstart companies like Apple. Google. or Uber to break quickly into new industries. the re- sult is often a bitter competition that forces established companies like : ifliiexpvlett-Packard, Microsoft. or taxi operators to adapt their business models -or perish. Thucydides's Trap refers to the natural, inevitable discombobulation that occurs when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power. This can happen in any sphere. But its implications are most dangerous in international affairs. For just as the original instance of Thucydides's Trap resulted in a war that brought ancient Greece to its knees, this phenomenon has haunted diplomacy in the millennia since. Today it has set the world's two biggest powers on a path to a cataclysm nobody wants, bud which they may prove unable to avoid. ARE THE US AND CHINA DESTINED FOR WAR? The world has never seen anything like the rapid, tectonic shift in the global balance of power created by the rise of China. If the US were a corporation. it would have accounted for 50 percent of the global eco- nomic market in the years immediately after World War II. By 1980, that had declined to 22 percent. Three decades of double-digit Chi- nese growth has reduced that US share to 16 percent today. If current trends continue, the US share of global economic output will decline further over the next three decades to 'ust ll rcent. Over this same J P' criod, China's share of the global economy will have soared from 2 P 8 Y percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 2016, well on its way to 30 percent in 2040. China's economic development is transforming it into a formida- ble political and military competitor. During the Cold War. as the US mounted clumsy responses to Soviet provocations, a sign in the Penta- gon said: "lf we ever faced a real enemy, we would be in deep trouble." China is a serious potential enemy. The possibility that the United States and China could find them- selves at war appears as unlikely as it would be unwise. The centennials recalling World War l, however, have reminded us of man's capacity for folly. When we say that war is "inconceivable." is this a statement about what is possible in the world-or only about what our limited minds can conceive? As far ahead as the eye can see. the defining question about global order is whether China and the US can escape Thucydides's Trap. Most contests that fit this pattern have ended badly. Over the past five hun- drcd years, in sixteen cases a major rising power has threatened to dis- place a ruling power. In twelve of those, the result was war. The four cases that avoided this outcome did so only because of huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part of challenger and chal- lenged alilte. The United States and China can likewise avoid war, but only if they can internalize two difficult truths. First. on the current trajectory. war between the US and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than currently recognized. Indeed. on the historical record. war lS IUOT? add to they h tainly major likely than not. By underestimating the danger, moreover, we the risk. If leaders in Beijing and Washington keep doing what ave done for the past decade. the US and China will almost cer- wind up at war. Second, war is not inevitable. History shows that ruling powers can manage relations with rivals. even those that threaten to overtake them, without triggering a war. The record of those successes, as well as the failures. offers many lessons for statesmen today. As George Santayana noted, only those who fail to study history are condemned to repeat it. The chapters that follow describe the origins of Thucydides's Trap, explore its dynamics. and explain its implications for the present con- test between the US and China. Part One provides a succinct summary of the rise of China. Everyone knows about China's growth but few have realized its magnitude or its consequences. To paraphrase former Czech president Vaclav Havel. it has happened so quickly that we have not yet had time to be astonished. Part Two locates recent developments in US-China relations on the broader canvas of history. This not only helps us understand current events. but also provides clues about where events are trending. Our review stretches back 2,500 years, to the time when the rapid growth of Athens shocked a dominant martial Sparta and led to the Pelopon- nesian War. Key examples from the past 500 years also provide insights into the ways in which the tension between rising and ruling powers can tilt the chessboard toward war. The closest analogue to the current standoff--Germany's challenge to Britain's ruling global empire be- fore World War I--should give us all pause. Part Three asks whether we should see current trends in America's relations with China as a gathering storm of similar proportions. Daily media reports of China's "aggressive" behavior and unwillingness to accept the "intemational rules-based order" established by the US af- -!El"W6l'l'd War I] describe incidents and accidents reminiscent of 1914. At the same time. a dose of self-awareness is due. If China were "just lilte us" when the US burst into the twentieth century brimming with confidence that the hundred years ahead would be an American era. the rivalry would be even more severe, and war even harder to avoid. If it actually followed in America's footsteps, we should expect to see Chi- nese troops enforcing Beijing's will from Mongolia to Australia, just as Theodore Roosevelt molded "our hemisphere" to his China is following a different trajectory than did the United States during its own surge to primacy. But in many aspects of China's rise, we can hear echoes. What does President Xi\_|inping's China want? In one line: to make China great again. The deepest aspiration of over a billion Chinese citizens is to make their nation not only rich, but also pow- erful. Indeed, their goal is a China so rich and so powerful that other nations will have no choice but to recognize its interests and give it the respect that it deserves. The sheer scale and ambition of this "China Dream" should disabuse us of any notion that the contest between (jliina and the United States will naturally subside as China becomes a "responsible stakeholder." This is especially so given what my former colleague Sam Huntington famously called a "clash of civilizations," a historical disjunction in which fundamentally different Chinese and American values and traditions make rapprochement between the two powers even more elusive. While resolution of the present rivalry may seem difficult to foresee. actual armed conflict appears distant. But is it? In truth, the paths to war are more varied and plausible (and even mundane) than we want to believe. From current confrontations in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and cyberspace, to a trade conflict that spirals out of control, it is frighteningly easy to develop scenarios in which Ameri- can and Chinese soldiers are killing each other. Though none of these scenarios seem likely, when we recall the unintended consequences of the assassination of the Hapsburg archdulte or of l(hrushchev's nuclear adventure in Cuba, we are reminded of just how narrow the gap is be- tween "unlikely" and "impossible." Part Four explains why war is not inevitable. Most of the policy community and general public are naively complacent about the possi- bility of war. Fatalists. meanwhile, see an irresistible force rapidly ap- proaching an immovable object. Neither side has it right. If leaders in both societies will study the successes and failures of the past, they will find a rich source of clues from which to fashion a strategy that can meet each nation's essential interests without war. The return to prominence of a 5,000-year-old civilization with 1.4 billion people is not a problem to be fixed. It is a condin'on-a chronic condition that will have to be managed over a generation. Success will require not just a new slogan, more frequent presidential summits. or additional meetings of departmental working groups. Managing this relationship without war will demand sustained attention, week by Wcclc. at the highest levels in both governments. It will require a depth of mutual understanding not seen since the Henry Kissinger-Zhou En- lai conversations that reestablished US-China relations in the 19705. Most significant, it will mean more radical changes in attitudes and ac- tions by leaders and the public alilte than anyone has yet undertaken. To escape Thucydides's Trap. we must be willing to think the unthinkable -:md imagine the unimaginable. Avoiding Thucydides's Trap in this case will require nothing less than bending the arc of history.

#### Extinction outweighs.

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

#### Absent US leadership, China will fill-in the innovation vacuum---that causes an expansion of technology that undermines human rights, expands repression of minorities, and cements dangerous bioethics.

Christopher Darby & Sarah Sewall 21. President and CEO of In-Q-Tel, Executive Vice President for Policy at IQT, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. “America’s Eroding Technological Advantage.” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-10/technology-innovation-wars>.

Since the early days of the Cold War, the United States has led the world in technology. Over the course of the so-called American century, the country conquered space, spearheaded the Internet, and brought the world the iPhone. In recent years, however, China has undertaken an impressive effort to claim the mantle of technological leadership, investing hundreds of billions of dollars in robotics, artificial intelligence, microelectronics, green energy, and much more. Washington has tended to view Beijing’s massive technology investments primarily in military terms, but defense capabilities are merely one aspect of great-power competition today—little more than table stakes. Beijing is playing a more sophisticated game, using technological innovation as a way of advancing its goals without having to resort to war. Chinese companies are selling 5G wireless infrastructure around the world, harnessing synthetic biology to bolster food supplies, and racing to build smaller and faster microchips, all in a bid to grow China’s power.

In the face of China’s technological drive, U.S. policymakers have called for greater government action to protect the United States’ lead. Much of the conventional wisdom is sensible: boost R & D spending, ease visa restrictions and develop more domestic talent, and build new partnerships with industry at home and with friends and allies abroad. But the real problem for the United States is much deeper: a flawed understanding of which technologies matter and of how to foster their development. As national security assumes new dimensions and great-power competition moves into different domains, the government’s thinking and policies have not kept pace. Nor is the private sector on its own likely to meet every technological need that bears on the country’s security.

In such an environment, Washington needs to broaden its horizons and support a wider range of technologies. It needs to back not only those technologies that have obvious military applications, such as hypersonic flight, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence, but also those traditionally thought of as civilian in nature, such as microelectronics and biotechnology. Washington also needs to help vital nonmilitary technologies make the transition to commercial success, stepping in with financing where the private sector will not.

AMERICA’S INNOVATION CHALLENGE

In the early decades of the Cold War, the United States spent billions of dollars dramatically expanding its scientific infrastructure. The Atomic Energy Commission, formed in 1946, assumed responsibility for the wartime labs that had pioneered nuclear weapons, such as the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the headquarters of the Manhattan Project, and went on to fund academic research centers, such as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The Department of Defense, founded in 1947, was given its own massive research budget, as was the National Science Foundation, established in 1950. After the Soviets launched the Sputnik satellite, in 1957, Washington created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or NASA, to win the space race, as well as what would become the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which was tasked with preventing a future technological surprise. By 1964, research and development accounted for 17 percent of all discretionary federal spending.

Partnering closely with academia and companies, the government funded a large variety of basic research—that is, research without a specific end use in mind. The goal was to build a technological foundation, defined primarily as conventional and nuclear defense capabilities, to ensure the country’s security. The research proved astonishingly successful. Government investment spawned cutting-edge capabilities that undergirded the United States’ military superiority, from supersonic jets to nuclear-powered submarines to guided missiles. The private sector, for its part, got to capitalize on the underlying intellectual property, turning capabilities into products and products into companies. GPS-enabled technologies, airbags, lithium batteries, touchscreens, voice recognition—all got their start thanks to government investment.

Yet over time, the government lost its lead in innovation. In 1964, the U.S. government was spending 1.86 percent of GDP on R & D, but by 1994, that share had fallen to 0.83 percent. During that same period, U.S. corporate R & D investment as a percentage of GDP nearly doubled. The numbers tell only half the story. Whereas much of the government’s R & D investment was aimed at finding new, game-changing discoveries, corporate R & D was mostly devoted to incremental innovation. The formula for growing revenue, the private sector realized, was to expand on existing products, adding functionality or making something faster, smaller, or more energy efficient. Companies focused on nearer-term technologies with commercial promise, rather than broad areas of inquiry that might take decades to bear fruit.

Increasingly, the most innovative R & D was taking place not in the labs of large corporations but at nimbler, privately funded startups, where venture capital investors were willing to tolerate more risk. Modern venture capital firms—partnerships that invest in early-stage companies—first arose in the 1970s, leading to early successes such as Apple and Microsoft, but it wasn’t until the dot-com bubble of the 1990s that this style of investment really took off. If the first phase of R & D outsourcing was from government labs to corporate America, this was the second phase: away from big businesses and toward small startups. Large companies began to spend less on internal R & D and more on what they called “corporate development,” or acquiring smaller, venture-backed companies with promising technologies.

The rise of venture capitalism created a great deal of wealth, but it didn’t necessarily further U.S. interests. Venture capital firms were judged by their ability to generate outsize returns within a ten-year window. That made them less interested in things such as microelectronics, a capital-intensive sector where profitability arrives in decades more so than years, and more interested in software companies, which need less capital to get going. The problem is that the companies receiving the most venture capital funding have been less likely to pursue national security priorities. When the American venture capital firm Accel hit the jackpot by investing early in Rovio Entertainment, the Finnish video game company behind the mobile app Angry Birds, it may have been a triumph for the firm, but in no way did it further U.S. interests.

Meanwhile, government funding of research continued its decline relative both to GDP and to R & D spending in the private sector. The Department of Defense retained the single biggest pot of federal research funding, but there was less money overall, and it became more dispersed across various agencies and departments, each pursuing its own priorities in the absence of a national strategy. As the best researchers were lured to the private sector, the government’s in-house scientific expertise atrophied. Once close relationships between private companies and Washington also suffered, as the federal government was no longer a major customer for many of the most innovative firms. U.S. agencies were rarely the first to buy advanced technology, and smaller startups generally lacked the lobbyists and lawyers needed to sell it to them anyway.

Globalization also drove a wedge between corporations and the government. The American market came to look less dominant in an international context, with the huge Chinese consumer market exerting a particularly powerful pull. Corporations now had to think of how their actions might look to customers outside the United States. Apple, for example, famously refused to unlock iPhones for the FBI, a decision that probably enhanced its brand internationally.

Further complicating matters, innovation itself was upending the traditional understanding of national security technology. More and more, technology was becoming “dual use,” meaning that both the civilian and the military sectors relied on it. That created new vulnerabilities, such as concerns about the security of microelectronic supply chains and telecommunications networks. Yet even though civilian technologies were increasingly relevant for national security, the U.S. government wasn’t responsible for them. The private sector was, and it was innovating at a rapid clip with which the government could barely keep pace. Taken together, all these trends have led to a concerning state of affairs: the interests of the private sector and the government are further apart than ever.

THE CHINESE JUGGERNAUT

The changes in American innovation would matter less if the world had remained unipolar. Instead, they occurred alongside the rise of a geopolitical rival. Over the past two decades, China has evolved from a country that largely steals and imitates technology to one that now also improves and even pioneers it. This is no accident; it is the result of the state’s deliberate, long-term focus. China has invested massively in R & D, with its share of global technology spending growing from under five percent in 2000 to over 23 percent in 2020. If current trends continue, China is expected to overtake the United States in such spending by 2025.

Central to China’s drive has been a strategy of “military-civil fusion,” a coordinated effort to ensure cooperation between the private sector and the defense industry. At the national, provincial, and local levels, the state backs the efforts of military organizations, state-owned enterprises, and private companies and entrepreneurs. Support might come in the form of research grants, shared data, government-backed loans, or training programs. It might even be as simple as the provision of land or office space; the government is creating whole new cities dedicated solely to innovation.

China’s investment in 5G technology shows how the process works in practice. Equipment for 5G makes up the backbone of a country’s cellular network infrastructure, and the Chinese company Huawei has emerged as a world leader in engineering and selling it—offering high-quality products at a lower price than its Finnish and South Korean competitors. The company has been buoyed by massive state support—by The Wall Street Journal’s count, some $75 billion in tax breaks, grants, loans, and discounts on land. Huawei has also benefited from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which provides generous loans to countries and Chinese companies to finance infrastructure construction.

Massive state investments in artificial intelligence have also paid off. Chinese researchers now publish more scientific papers in that field than American ones do. Part of this success is the result of funding, but something else plays a big role: access to enormous amounts of data. Beijing has fueled the rise of powerhouse companies that sweep up endless information about their users. These include Alibaba, an e-commerce giant; Tencent, which developed the all-purpose WeChat app; Baidu, which began as a search engine but now offers a range of online products; DJI, which dominates the consumer drone market; and SenseTime, which provides facial recognition technology for China’s video surveillance network and is said to be the world’s most valuable artificial intelligence company. As a matter of law, these companies are required to cooperate with the state for intelligence purposes, a broad mandate that is almost certainly used to force companies to share data for many other reasons.

That information increasingly involves people living outside China. Chinese companies have woven a global web of data-gathering apps that collect foreigners’ private information about their finances, their search history, their location, and more. Those who make a mobile payment through a Chinese app, for example, could have their personal data routed through Shanghai and added to China’s growing trove of knowledge about foreign nationals. Such information no doubt makes it easier for the Chinese government to track, say, an indebted Western bureaucrat who could be convinced to spy for Beijing or a Tibetan activist who has taken refuge abroad.

China’s hunger for data extends to some of the most personal information imaginable: our own DNA. Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, BGI—a Chinese genome-sequencing company that began as a government-funded research group—has broken ground on some 50 new laboratories abroad designed to help governments test for the virus. China has legitimate reasons to build these labs, but it also has an ugly record of forcibly collecting DNA data from Tibetans and Uighurs as part of its efforts to monitor these minorities. Given that BGI runs China’s national library of genomics data, it is conceivable that through BGI testing, foreigners’ biological data might end up in that repository.

Indeed, China has shown great interest in biotechnology, even if it has yet to catch up to the United States. Combined with massive computing power and artificial intelligence, innovations in biotechnology could help solve some of humanity’s most vexing challenges, from disease and famine to energy production and climate change. Researchers have mastered the gene-editing tool CRISPR, allowing them to grow wheat that resists disease, and have managed to encode video in the DNA of bacteria, raising the possibility of a new, cost-effective method of data storage. Specialists in synthetic biology have invented a new way of producing nylon—with genetically engineered microorganisms instead of petrochemicals. The economic implications of the coming biotechnology revolution are staggering: the McKinsey Global Institute has estimated the value of biotechnology’s many potential applications at up to $4 trillion over the next ten to 20 years.

Like all powerful technologies, however, biotechnology has a dark side. It is not inconceivable, for example, that some malicious actor could create a biological weapon that targeted a specific ethnic group. On controversial questions—such as how much manipulation of the human genome is acceptable—countries will accept different degrees of risk in the name of progress and take different ethical positions. The country that leads biotechnology’s development will be the one that most profoundly shapes the norms and standards around its use. And there is reason to worry if that country is China. In 2018, the Chinese scientist He Jiankui genetically engineered the DNA of twin babies, prompting an international uproar. Beijing portrayed him as a rogue researcher and punished him. Yet the Chinese government’s disdain for human rights, coupled with its quest for technological supremacy, suggests that it could embrace a lax, even dangerous approach to bioethics.

THINKING BIGGER

Washington has monitored China’s technological progress through a military lens, worrying about how it contributes to Chinese defense capabilities. But the challenge is much broader. China’s push for technological supremacy is not simply aimed at gaining a battlefield advantage; Beijing is changing the battlefield itself. Although commercial technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology will undoubtedly have military applications, China envisions a world of great-power competition in which no shots need to be fired. Technological supremacy promises the ability to dominate the civilian infrastructure on which others depend, providing enormous influence. That is a major motivation behind Beijing’s support for high-tech civilian infrastructure exports. The countries buying Chinese systems may think they are merely receiving electric grids, health-care technology, or online payment systems, but in reality, they may also be placing critical national infrastructure and citizens’ data in Beijing’s hands. Such exports are China’s Trojan horse.

Despite the changing nature of geopolitical competition, the United States still tends to equate security with traditional defense capabilities. Consider microelectronics. They are critical components not only for a range of commercial products but also for virtually every major defense system, from aircraft to warships. Because they will power advances in artificial intelligence, they will also shape the United States’ future economic competitiveness. Yet investment in microelectronics has fallen through the cracks. Neither the private sector nor the government is adequately funding innovation—the former due to the large capital requirements and long time horizons involved and the latter because it has focused more on securing current supplies than on innovating. Although China has had a hard time catching up to the United States in this area, it is only a matter of time before it moves up the microelectronics value chain.

Another casualty of the United States’ overly narrow conception of security and innovation is 5G technology. By dominating this market, China has built a global telecommunications network that can serve geopolitical purposes. One fear is that Beijing could help itself to data running on 5G networks. Another is the possibility that China might sabotage or disrupt adversaries’ communications networks in a crisis. Most U.S. policymakers failed to predict the threat posed by Chinese 5G infrastructure. It wasn’t until 2019 that Washington sounded the alarm about Huawei, but by then, there was little it could do. U.S. companies had never offered an end-to-end wireless network, instead focusing on manufacturing individual components, such as handsets and routers. Nor had any developed its own radio access network, a system for sending signals across network devices that is needed to build an end-to-end 5G system like that offered by Huawei and a few other companies. As a result, the United States found itself in an absurd situation: threatening to end intelligence cooperation if close allies adopted Huawei’s 5G technology without having an attractive alternative to offer.

Digital infrastructure may be today’s battle, but biotechnology will likely be the next. Unfortunately, it, too, is not considered a priority within the U.S. government. The Department of Defense has understandably shown little interest in it. Part of the explanation for that lies in the fact that the United States, like many other countries, has signed a treaty renouncing biological weapons. Still, biotechnology has other implications for the Pentagon, from changing manufacturing to improving the health of service personnel. More important, any comprehensive assessment of the national interest must recognize biotechnology’s implications for ethics, the economy, health, and planetary survival.

Because so many of the gaps in U.S. innovation can be traced back to a narrow view of the national interest and which technologies are needed to support it, the Biden administration’s first step should be to expand that understanding. Officials need to appreciate both the threats and the opportunities of the latest technologies: the havoc that could be wreaked by a paralyzed 5G network or unscrupulous genetic engineering, as well as the benefits that could come from sustainable energy sources and better and more efficient health care.

The Biden administration’s second step should be to create a process for aligning government investments with national priorities. Today, federal funding is skewed toward military capabilities. This reflects a political reality: the Pentagon is the rare part of the government that reliably receives bipartisan budgetary support. Fighter jets and missile defense, for example, are well funded, whereas pandemic preparedness and clean energy get short shrift. But setting the right national technological priorities raises questions that can be answered only by making judgments about the full range of national needs. What are the most important problems that technology can help solve? Which technologies have the power to solve only one problem, and which might solve multiple problems? Getting the answers to such questions right requires taking a truly national perspective. The current method doesn’t do so.

A properly run process would begin with what national security professionals call a “net assessment”—in this case, an analysis of the state of global technological progress and market trends to give policymakers the information necessary to work from a shared baseline. To be actionable, the process would establish a handful of near- and long-term priorities. A compelling candidate for long-term investment, for instance, might be microelectronics, which are foundations for both military and civilian innovation but have difficulty attracting private investment dollars. Another long-term priority might be biotechnology, given its importance for the economy and the future of humanity. As for short-term priorities, the U.S. government might consider launching an international effort to combat disinformation operations or to promote 5G innovation. Whatever the specific priorities chosen, the important thing is that they be deliberate and clear, guiding the United States’ decisions and signaling its aspirations.

A MARKET MINDSET

Supporting those priorities is another matter altogether. The current approach—with the government funding only limited research and the private sector taking care of commercializing the results—isn’t working. Too much government-funded research remains locked in the lab, unable to make the leap to commercial viability. Worse, when it manages to leave U.S. government labs, it often ends up in foreign hands, depriving the United States of taxpayer-financed intellectual property.

The U.S. government will need to take a more active role in helping research make it to the market. Many universities have created offices that focus on commercializing academic research, but most federal research institutions have not. That must change. In the same spirit, the U.S. government should develop so-called sandboxes—public-private research facilities where industry, the academy, and the government can work together. In 2014, Congress did just that when it established Manufacturing USA, a network of facilities that conduct research into advanced manufacturing technologies. A similar initiative for microelectronics has been proposed, and there is no reason not to create additional sandboxes in other areas, too.

The U.S. government could also help with commercialization by building national data sets for research purposes, along with improved privacy protections to reassure the people whose information ends up in them. Such data sets would be particularly useful in accelerating progress in the field of artificial intelligence, which feeds off massive quantities of data—something that only the government and a handful of big technology companies currently possess. Success in synthetic biology, along with wider medical research, will also depend on data. Thus, the U.S. government should increase the quantity and diversity of the data in the National Institutes of Health’s genome library and curate and label that information so that it can be used more easily.

All this help with commercialization will be for naught, however, if the startups with the most promising technologies for national security cannot attract enough capital. Some of them run into difficulties at the early and late stages of growth: in the beginning, they have a hard time courting investors willing to make high-risk bets, and later on, when they are ready to expand, they find it difficult to attract investors willing to write large checks. To fill the gaps at both stages, the U.S. government needs its own investment vehicles.

We work at the parent company of In-Q-Tel, which offers a promising model for early-stage investment. Created in 1999 by the CIA, In-Q-Tel is an independent, not-for-profit firm that invests in technology startups that serve the national interest. (One early recipient of In-Q-Tel’s investment was Keyhole, which became the platform for Google Earth.) Now also funded by the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and other U.S. agencies, In-Q-Tel identifies and adapts innovative technologies for its government customers. Compared with a federal agency, a private, not-for-profit firm can more easily attract the investment and technology talent required to make informed investments. There is every reason to take this model and apply it to broader priorities. Even just $100 million to $500 million of early-stage funding per year—a drop in the bucket of the federal budget—could help fill the gap between what the private sector is providing and what the nation needs.

For the later stage, policymakers could draw inspiration from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, the federal agency responsible for investing in development projects abroad, which in 2018 was first authorized to make equity investments. A late-stage investment fund could be structured as an arm of that agency or as a fully independent, not-for-profit private entity funded by the government. Either way, it would provide badly needed capital to companies ready to scale up their operations. Compared with early-stage government support, late-stage government support would have to be greater, in the range of $1 billion to $5 billion annually. To expand the impact of this government investment, both the early- and the late-stage funds should encourage “sidecar” investments, which would allow profit-seeking firms and individuals to join the government in making, and potentially profiting from, technology bets.

Government-sponsored investment funds like these would not only fill critical gaps in private-sector investment; they would also allow taxpayers to share in the success of research their money has funded. Currently, most government funding for technology comes in the form of grants, such as the Small Business Innovation Research grants administered by the Small Business Administration; this is true even of some programs that are billed as investment funds. This means that taxpayers foot the bill for failures but cannot share in the success if a company makes it big. As the economist Mariana Mazzucato has pointed out in these pages, “governments have socialized risks but privatized rewards.”

Not-for-profit investment vehicles working on behalf of the government would have another benefit: they would allow the United States to play offense when it comes to technological competition. For too long, it has played defense. For example, it has banned the export of sensitive technology and restricted foreign investment that might pose a national security risk—even though these actions can harm U.S. businesses and do nothing to promote innovation. Supporting commercialization with government-sponsored equity investment will not be cheap, but some of the upfront costs would likely be regained and could be reinvested. There are also nonmonetary returns: investing in national priorities, including infrastructure that could be exported to U.S. allies, would enhance the United States’ soft power.

INNOVATION EVER AFTER

President Joe Biden has pledged to “build back better” and restore the United States’ global leadership. On the campaign trial, he laid out promising proposals to promote American innovation. He called for dramatically boosting federal R & D spending, including some $300 billion to be focused on breakthrough technologies to enhance U.S. competitiveness. That is a good start, but he could make this drive far more effective if he first created a rigorous process for identifying top technological priorities. Biden said he supports “a scaled-up version” of the Small Business Innovation Research grants and has backed “infrastructure for educational institutions and partners to expand research.” Even greater opportunity lies in filling the gaps in private-sector investment and undertaking a long-overdue expansion of government support for commercialization.

On innovation, if the United States opts for just more of the same, its economy, its security, and its citizens’ well-being will all suffer. The United States will thus further the end of its global leadership and the unfettered rise of China. Biden has the right instincts. Yet in order to sustain its technological dominance, the country will have to fundamentally reenvision the why and how of innovation. Biden will no doubt be consumed with addressing domestic challenges, but he has spent much of his career promoting the United States’ global leadership. By revamping American technological innovation, he could do both.

#### Failure to stop China allows them to establish a global dystopian surveillance state. Only Western democracies have self-correcting protections to safeguard citizens from over-stretch.

Charlie Campbell 19. East Asia Correspondent for TIME. "The Entire System Is Designed to Suppress Us': What the Chinese Surveillance State Means for the Rest of the World." https://time.com/5735411/china-surveillance-privacy-issues/.

Still, the risks are considerable. As Western democracies enact safeguards to protect citizens from the rampant harvesting of data by government and corporations, China is exporting its AI-powered surveillance technology to authoritarian governments around the world. Chinese firms are providing high-tech surveillance tools to at least 18 nations from Venezuela to Zimbabwe, according to a 2018 report by Freedom House. China is a battleground where the modern surveillance state has reached a nadir, prompting censure from governments and institutions around the globe, but it is also where rebellion against its overreach is being most ferociously fought.

“Today’s economic business models all encourage people to share data,” says Lokman Tsui, a privacy expert at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. In China, he adds, we are seeing “what happens when the state goes after that data to exploit and weaponize it.”

Some 1,500 miles northwest of where Mrs. Chen recovered her purse, surveillance in China’s restive region of Xinjiang has helped put an estimated 1 million people into “re-education centers” akin to concentration camps, according to the U.N. Many were arrested, tried and convicted by computer algorithm based on data harvested by the cameras that stud every 20 steps in some parts.

In the name of fighting terrorism, members of predominantly Muslim ethnic groups—mostly Uighurs but also Kazakhs, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz—are forced to surrender biometric data like photos, fingerprints, DNA, blood and voice samples. Police are armed with a smartphone app that then automatically flags certain behaviors, according to reverse engineering by the advocacy group Human Rights Watch. Those who grow a beard, leave their house via a back door or visit the mosque often are red-flagged by the system and interrogated.

Sarsenbek Akaruli, 45, a veterinarian and trader from the Xinjiang city of Ili, was arrested on Nov. 2, 2017, and remains in a detention camp after police found the banned messaging app WhatsApp on his cell phone, according to his wife Gulnur Kosdaulet. A citizen of neighboring Kazakhstan, she has traveled to Xinjiang four times to search for him but found even friends in the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reluctant to help. “Nobody wanted to risk being recorded on security cameras talking to me in case they ended up in the camps themselves,” she tells TIME.

Surveillance governs all aspects of camp life. Bakitali Nur, 47, a fruit and vegetable exporter in the Xinjiang town of Khorgos, was arrested after authorities became suspicious of his frequent business trips abroad. The father of three says he spent a year in a single room with seven other inmates, all clad in blue jumpsuits, forced to sit still on plastic stools for 17 hours straight as four HikVision cameras recorded every move. “Anyone caught talking or moving was forced into stress positions for hours at a time,” he says.

Bakitali was released only after he developed a chronic illness. But his surveillance hell continued over five months of virtual house arrest, which is common for former detainees. He was forbidden from traveling outside his village without permission, and a CCTV camera was installed opposite his home. Every time he approached the front door, a policeman would call to ask where he was going. He had to report to the local government office every day to undergo “political education” and write a self-criticism detailing his previous day’s activities. Unable to travel for work, former detainees like Bakitali are often obliged to toil at government factories for wages as miserly as 35¢ per day, according to former workers interviewed by TIME. “The entire system is designed to suppress us,” Bakitali says in Almaty, Kazakhstan, where he escaped in May.

The result is dystopian. When every aspect of life is under constant scrutiny, it’s not just “bad” behavior that must be avoided. Muslims in Xinjiang are under constant pressure to act in a manner that the CCP would approve. While posting controversial material online is clearly reckless, not using social media at all could also be considered suspicious, so Muslims share glowing news about the country and party as a means of defense. Homes and businesses now feel obliged to display a photograph of China’s President Xi Jinping in a manner redolent of North Koreans’ public displays for founder Kim Il Sung. Asked why he had a picture of Xi in his taxi, one Uighur driver replied nervously, “It’s the law.”

Besides the surveillance cameras, people are required to register their ID numbers for activities as mundane as renting a karaoke booth. Muslims are forced from buses to have their IDs checked while ethnic Han Chinese passengers wait in their seats. At intersections, drivers are ushered from their vehicles by armed police and through Tera-Snap “revolving body detector” equipment. In the southern Xinjiang oasis town of Hotan, a facial–recognition booth is even installed at the local produce market. When a system struggled to compute the face of this Western TIME reporter, the impatient Han women queuing behind berated the operator, “Hurry up, he’s not a Uighur, let him through.”

China strenuously denies human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, justifying its surveillance leviathan as battling the “three evils” of “separatism, terrorism and extremism.” But the situation has been described as a “horrific campaign of repression” by the U.S. and condemned by the U.N. Washington has also started sanctioning companies like HikVision whose facial–recognition technology is ubiquitous across the Alaska-size region. But Western aversion to surveillance is much broader and stems in no small part from abuses like the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which the “scraped” personal information of up to 87 million people was acquired by the political consultancy to swing elections around the world.

China is also rolling out Big Data and surveillance to inculcate “positive” behavior in its citizens via a Social Credit system. In China’s eastern coastal city of Rongcheng, home to 670,000 people, every person is automatically given 1,000 points. Fighting with neighbors will cost you 5 points; fail to clean up after your dog and you lose 10. Donating blood gains 5. Fall below a certain threshold and it’s impossible to get a loan or book high-speed train tickets. Some Chinese see the benefit. High school teacher Zhu Junfang, 42, enjoys perks such as discounted heating bills and improved health care after a series of good works. “Because of the Social Credit system, vehicles politely let pedestrians cross the street, and during a recent blizzard people volunteered to clear the snow to earn extra points,” she says.

Such intrusive government is anathema to most in the West, where aversion to surveillance is much broader and more visceral. Whether it’s our Internet browser history, selfies uploaded to social media, data scavenged from fitness trackers or smart-home devices possibly recording the most intimate bedroom conversations, we are all living in what’s been dubbed a “surveillance economy.” In her book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, Shoshana Zuboff describes this as “human experience [broken down into data] as free raw material for commercial practices of extraction, prediction, and sales.”

When it comes to facial recognition, resistance is intense given the huge potential for indiscriminate data harvesting. The E.U. is reviewing regulations to give its citizens explicit rights over use of their facial-recognition data. While tech giants Microsoft and Amazon have already deployed the technology, they are also calling for clear legal parameters to govern its use. Other than privacy, there are equality issues too. According to a study by MIT Media Lab, facial-recognition software correctly identified white men 99% to 100% of the time, but that dipped as low as 65% for women of color. Civil-liberties groups are especially uneasy since facial recognition, despite its widespread use by American police, is rarely cited as evidence in subsequent court filings. In May, San Francisco became the first major U.S. city to block police from using facial–recognition software.

Even in China, where civil liberties have long been sacrificed for what the CCP deems the greater good, privacy concerns are bubbling up. On Oct. 28, a professor in eastern China sued Hangzhou Safari Park for “violating consumer privacy law by compulsorily collecting visitors’ individual characteristics,” after the park announced its intention to adopt facial–recognition entry gates. In Chongqing, a move to install surveillance cameras in 15,000 licensed taxicabs has met a backlash from drivers. “Now I can’t cuddle my girlfriend off duty or curse my bosses,” one driver grumbles to TIME.

Russia’s election meddling around the world highlights the risks of commercially harvested data being repurposed for nefarious goals. It’s a message taken to heart in Hong Kong, where millions have protested over the past five months to push for more democracy. These demonstrators have found themselves in the crosshairs after being identified via CCTV cameras or social media. Employees for state airline Cathay Pacific have been fired and others investigated based on evidence reportedly gleaned via online posts and private messaging apps.

This has led demonstrators to adopt intricate tactics to evade Big Brother’s all-seeing eye. Clad in helmets, face masks and reflective goggles, they prepare for confrontations with the police with military precision. A vanguard clutch umbrellas aloft to shield their activities from prying eyes, before a second wave advances to attack overhead cameras with tape, spray paint and buzz saws. From behind, a covering fire of laser pointers attempts to disrupt the recordings of security officers’ body-mounted cameras.

Fending off the cameras is just one response. When Matthew, 22, who used only his first name for his own safety, heads to the front lines, he always leaves his regular cell phone at home and takes a burner. Aside from swapping SIM cards, he rarely reuses handsets multiple times since each has a unique International Mobile Equipment Identity digital serial number that he says police can trace. He also switches among different VPNs—software to mask a user’s location—and pays for protest–related purchases with cash or untraceable top-up credit cards. Voice calls are made only as a last resort, he says. “Once I had no choice but to make a call, but I threw away my SIM immediately afterward.”

The Hong Kong government denies its smart cameras and lampposts use facial-recognition technology. But “it really comes down to whether you trust institutions,” says privacy expert Tsui. For Matthew, the risks are real and stark: “We are fighting to stop Hong Kong becoming another Xinjiang.”

Ultimately, even protesters’ forensic safeguards may not be enough as technology advances. In his Beijing headquarters, Huang Yongzhen, CEO of AI firm Watrix, shows off his latest gait-recognition software, which can identify people from 50 meters away by analyzing thousands of metrics about their walk—even with faces covered or backs to the camera. It’s already been rolled out by security services across China, he says, though he’s ambivalent about privacy concerns. “From our perspective, we just provide the technology,” he says. “As for how it’s used, like all high tech, it may be a double-edged sword.”

Little wonder a backlash against AI-powered surveillance is gathering pace. In the U.S., legislation was introduced in Congress in July that would prohibit the use of facial recognition in public housing. Japanese scientists have produced special glasses designed to fool the technology. Public campaigns have railed against commercial uses—from Ticket-master using facial recognition for concert tickets to JetBlue for boarding passes. In May, Democratic Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio–Cortez linked the technology to “a global rise in authoritarianism and fascism.”

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#### Preventing existential risk and framing it as a “we” claim is good.

Coles and Susen 18—Research Professor at the Institute for Social Justice at Australian Catholic University AND Reader in Sociology at the School of Arts and Social Sciences of City, University of London (Romand and Simon, “The Pragmatic Vision of Visionary Pragmatism: The Challenge of Radical Democracy in a Neoliberal World Order,” Contemporary Political Theory May 2018, Volume 17, Issue 2, pp 250–262)

Visionary pragmatism is driven by a political ethos that accents radical receptivity and a sense that a greater degree of wildness in our efforts is indispensable for transformative democratic movements. While some of my earlier works accented the ethical character of receptive generosity in political life, Visionary Pragmatism argues that receptivity is indispensable for generating democratic power – precisely because receptivity involves vulnerability, relationship formation, capacities to modulate, and learning in unexpected ways amidst difficult differences. Drawing on my engagements with the movement for democratic action research in Northern Arizona, I argue that receptive practices engender remarkable capacities for fostering grassroots critique and alternatives, powerful political assemblages across differences, and transformative dynamics in the face of what otherwise appear to be intractable problems. Our best and most powerful possibilities for co-creating urgent democratic change almost always advance along pathways engendered partly through relationships of careful attentiveness to what we initially took to be oblique, unintelligible – or, perhaps, even odious.

For these reasons, my political, theoretical, and pedagogical engagements move across many different configurations and a wider range of situations, ideologies, modes, and commitments than most. Eschewing a single subject position, in Visionary Pragmatism, I experiment with first-person plurals in which the ‘we’ morphs in relation to the different loci of initiative that animate my reflections. Sometimes ‘we’ refers to proponents of radical and ecological democracy very broadly, sometimes to scholars in higher education, sometimes to political theorists, sometimes to the action research movement that formed among people at Northern Arizona University and its community partners, sometimes to a specific action research team, sometimes to all people facing the possibility of planetary ecological collapse. Among the many things I find compelling about the writing of James Baldwin is how he shifts his pronouns without notice – for example, sometimes using ‘we’ to represent black people, sometimes as an uncanny member of the white-majority United States. This rhetorical shiftiness encroaches upon and pulls his readers – especially white readers – beyond the ‘innocence that constitutes the crime’ of their assumed individual and collective white subjectivities in ways that work in visceral, relational, and conceptual registers (Baldwin, 1992, p. 6). Such uncertainty has significant capacity to erode habits and defences, as one finds oneself unexpectedly drawn into perspectives, locations, energies, and tendencies that unsettle and reorient one’s own subjectivity. Much of my work has theorized ‘moving democracy’, and my rhetorical shifting of the first-person plural is a textual practice that aims to enhance this in ways that facilitate reflection.

Throughout Visionary Pragmatism, I argue that there are powerful reasons for active hope. At the same time, we do not live far from tipping points beyond which planetary ecological collapse, globalizing neoliberal fascism, and violent chaos may overwhelm our efforts. I do not think so much in terms of pessimism or optimism as I do about seizing and co-creating opportunities for catalysing dynamic changes in theory and practice that foster a powerful movement of receptive democracy, for complex democratic commonwealth and ecological flourishing. In one sense, as Walter Benjamin’s discussion of Paul Klee’s ‘Angelus Novus’ makes poignantly clear, it is always ‘too late’ for so much and so many, as catastrophic history keeps piling wreckage at our feet. At the same time, there are what Benjamin (1968) calls ‘weak messianic powers’ that emerge as the retroactive force of salvaged aspects of past struggles ignite sparks with emerging struggles to explode the continuum of progress. In this sense, up to our day, it is never altogether too late. With the language of ‘game-transformative practice’, I argue that a visionary-pragmatic movement of radical democracy must do something analogous in response to the fierce urgency of now, to avoid a sixth extinction in which this possibility could well become a casualty.

### AT: Tuck & Yang 12---2AC

#### Ontology has a narrative deficit – “incommensurability” frame makes indigenous liberation impossible by setting terms of victory as all-or-nothing – reifies acquiescence to subtler settler power.

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The prescription for decolonisation—that is, a normative project committed to the liberation of the colonised and the overturning of colonial relationships of power (Kohn & McBride, 2011: 3)—is indeed one of the most counterhegemonic implications of the settler colonial paradigm as applied to IsraelPalestine, potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’ (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). What, however, does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of envisioning decolonisation? As Veracini (2007) notes, while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address the lack of attention paid to the experiences of Indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonisation (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), there is nevertheless a ‘narrative deficit’ when it comes to imagining settler decolonisation. While Veracini (2007) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualisation, it is apparent that the structural perspective of the paradigm in many ways closes down possibilities of imagining the type of social and political transformation to which the notion of decolonisation aspires. In this regard, there is a worrying tendency (if not tautological discrepancy) in settler colonial studies, where the only solution to settler colonialism is decolonisation—which a faithful adherence to the paradigm renders largely unachievable, if not impossible.

To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to return to Wolfe’s (2013a: 257) account of settler colonialism as guided by a ‘zero-sum logic whereby settler societies, for all their internal complexities, uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives’. The structuralism of this account has immense power as a means of mapping forms of injustice and indignity as well as strategies of resistance and refusal, and Wolfe is careful to show how transmutations of the logic of elimination are complex, variable, discontinuous and uneven. Yet, in seeking to elucidate the logic of elimination as the overarching historical force guiding settler-native relations there is an operational weakness in the theory, whereby such a logic is simply there, omnipresent and manifest even when (and perhaps especially when) it appears not to be; the settler colonial studies scholar need only read it into a situation or context. It thus hurtles from the past to the present into the future, never to be fully extinguished until the native is, or until history itself ends. There is thus a powerful ontological (if not metaphysical) dimension to Wolfe’s account, where there is such thing as a ‘settler will’ that inherently desires the elimination of the native and the distinction between the settler and native can only ever be categorical, founded as it is on the ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ (2013a: 258). It is here that the differences between earlier settler colonial scholarship on Israel-Palestine and the recent settler colonial turn come into clearest view. While Jamal Hilal’s (1976) Marxist account of the conflict, for instance, engaged Palestinians and Jewish Israelis in terms of their relations to the means of production, Wolfe’s account brings its own ontology: the bourgeoisie/proletariat distinction becomes that of settler/native, and the class struggle the struggle between settler, who seeks to destroy and replace the native, and native, who can only ever push back. Indeed, if the settler colonial paradigm views history in similar teleological terms to the Marxist framework, it does not offer the same hopeful vision of a liberated future. After all, settler colonialism has only one story to tell—‘either total victory or total failure’ (Veracini, 2007).

Veracini’s attempt to disaggregate different forms of settler decolonisation is revealing of the difficulties that come along with this zero-sum perspective. It is significant to note that beyond settler evacuation (which may decolonise territory, he cautions, but not necessarily relationships) the picture he paints is a relatively bleak one. For Veracini (2011: 5), claims for decolonisation from Indigenous peoples in settler societies can take two broad forms: an ‘anticolonial rhetoric expressing a demand for indigenous sovereign independence and self-determination… and an “ultra”-colonial one that seeks a reconstituted partnership with the [settler state] and advocates a return to a relatively more respectful middle ground and “treaty” conditions’. While both, he suggests, are tempting strategies in the struggle for change, though ‘ultimately ineffective against settler colonial structures of domination’ (2011: 5), it is the latter strategy that invites Veracini’s most scathing assessment. As he writes,

under settler colonial conditions the independent polity is the settler polity and sanctioning the equal rights of indigenous peoples has historically been used as a powerful weapon in the denial of indigenous entitlement and in the enactment of various forms of coercive assimilation. This decolonisation actually enhances the subjection of indigenous peoples… it is at best irrelevant and at worst detrimental to indigenous peoples in settler societies (2011: 6-7).

The ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ plays a particularly ambivalent role in Veracini’s (2011: 6) formulation, where the categorical distinction between settler and native obstructs the ‘possibility of a genuinely decolonised relationship’ (by virtue of its lopsidedness) yet is a necessary political strategy to guard against the absorption of Indigenous people into the settler fold, which would represent settler colonialism’s final victory. The battle here is between a ‘settler colonialism [that] is designed to produce a fundamental discontinuity as its “logic of elimination” runs its course until it actually extinguishes the settler colonial relation’ and an anti-colonial struggle that ‘must aim to keep the settler-indigenous relationship going’ (2011: 7). In other words, the categorical distinction produced by the frontier must be maintained in order to struggle against its effects. Given the lack of options presented to Indigenous peoples by Veracini (2014: 315), his conclusion that settler decolonisation demands a ‘radical, post-settler colonial passage’ is perhaps not surprising – although he has ‘no suggestion as to how this may be achieved and [is] pessimistic about its feasibility’.

Scholars have long reckoned with the ambivalence of the settler colonial situation, which is simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising (Curthoys, 1999: 288). Given the generally dreadful Fourth World circumstances facing many Indigenous peoples in settler societies, it could be argued that there is good reason for such pessimism. The settler colonial paradigm, in this sense, offers an important caution against celebratory narratives of progress. Wolfe (1994), it must be recalled, wrote the original articulation of his thesis precisely against the idea of ‘historical rupture’ that dominated in Australia post-Mabo, and was thus as much a scholarly intervention as it was a political challenge to the idea of Australia having broken with its colonial past. Nonetheless, the fatalism of the settler colonial paradigm—whereby decolonisation is by and large put beyond the realms of possibility—has seen it come under considerable critique for reifying settler colonialism as a transhistorical meta-structure where colonial relations of domination are inevitable (Macoun & Strakosch, 2013: 435; Snelgrove et al., 2014: 9). Not only does Wolfe’s ontology erase contingency, heterogeneity and (crucially) agency (Merlan, 1997; Rowse, 2014), but its polarised framework effectively ‘puts politics to death’ (Svirsky, 2014: 327). In response to such critiques, Wolfe (2013a: 213) suggests that ‘the repudiation of binarism’ may just represent a ‘settler perspective’. However, as Elizabeth Povinelli (1997: 22) has astutely shown, it is in this regard that the totalising logic of Wolfe’s structure of invasion rests on a disciplinary gesture where ‘any discussion which does not insist on the polarity of the [settler] colonial project’ is assimilationist, worse still, genocidal in effect if not intent. Any attempt to ‘explore the dialogical or hybrid nature of colonial subjectivity’—which would entail working beyond the bounds of absolute polarity—is disciplined as complicit in the settler colonial project itself, leaving ‘the only nonassimilationist position one that adheres strictly and solely to a critique of [settler] state discourse’. This gesture not only disallows the possibility of counter-publics and strategic alliances (even limited ones), but also comes dangerously close to ‘resistance as acquiescence’ insofar as the settler colonial studies scholar may malign the structures set in play by settler colonialism, but only from a safe distance unsullied by the messiness of ambivalences and contradictions of settler and Native subjectivities and relations. Opposition is thus left as our only option, but, as we know from critical anti-colonial and postcolonial scholarship, opposition in itself is not decolonisation.

#### Settler political grammars can be tactically repurposed – refusal on behalf of all natives is racist romanticism – alt precludes concrete change.

Rosenow 19—Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Oxford Brookes University (Doerthe, “Decolonising the Decolonisers? Of Ontological Encounters in the GMO Controversy and Beyond,” Global Society, 33:1, 82-99, dml)

Despite the force and importance of this argument, I have felt slightly uneasy when reading those conclusions. Focusing on radical ontological difference can easily lead to a romanticised reification of other peoples’ difference that is in danger of ignoring actual political struggles and demands on the ground. As Cusicanqui argues, those struggles might very well emerge out of an “indigenous modernity”, rather than an insistence on the right to one’s difference. By this she means that some Indigenous people aim to formulate a hegemonic vision for how to structure a society that is valid for everyone (Indigenous AND non-Indigenous): they work for a society that is in their “image and likeness”, and to use modern notions such as “citizenship” for this purpose, rather than rejecting the latter as irreconcilable with one’s own world.39 By contrast, some North American Indigenous intellectuals call for an Indigenous “resurgence” that, rather than seeking hegemony, altogether turns away from seeking recognition by wider (colonial) “society”. As Leanne Betasamosake Simpson points out, in such “resurgent mobilization … there is virtually no room for white people”. 40 But my unease was also emerging from something else, which is what I want to focus on in this article: the problem that encounters and conflicts are yet again made sense of within overarching structures of knowledge production rather than cultivation (despite the intention to do otherwise). As de la Cadena herself makes clear in the quotation above, what is encountered as “different” is inevitably described “in forms that I could understand” (my emphasis)—even whilst simultaneously recognising that one’s description does not capture what the encountered practices actually do. Sense-making, for de la Cadena, takes place at what could be called two levels: At a first level, there is the inevitable process of making sense of an alienating affective experience on the spot, from within one’s own framework of understanding the world. At a second level, then, de la Cadena attempts to make legible her grappling and not-understanding in the context of a book for an academically literate and interested audience—in other words, in the writing-up of her ethnographic research. In Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s case, given that their articles do not aim to make an empirical contribution, sense-making takes place at what could be called a third level: what is drawn upon is the understanding that emerged out of the ethnographic work of others, which is brought into conversation with various bodies of theoretical work in order to make a conceptual contribution. This takes place via the coining of central concepts and the outlining of all-encompassing frameworks that are meant to help us understand the analytical, normative and political consequences of their argument for scholarly work more broadly. The ontological encounters of others are used to delineate the merits of ontological encounters in general, in IR and beyond. This objective leads to a particular way of developing and structuring a generic argument that makes it difficult to move beyond sense-making frameworks that are necessarily geared towards settling all those unsettling and disconcerting experiences that were the focus of the articles in the first place. This is also the problem of some central decolonial work. Drawing on Edouard Glissant, Mignolo, for example, critiques the “requirement of transparency” that forms the basis for understanding in Western social science scholarship. He argues for the “right to opacity” of those located on the other side of the colonial difference.41 But this claim sits at odds with his simultaneous desire to write a new, all-encompassing history of “the modern/colonial world system”. 42 And like in Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s articles, terms such as “pluriversality”43 or “diversality”44 are coined in order to have a (one!) concept for a similarly all-encompassing solution to domination. While de la Cadena is critical of her own “anxiety to understand coherently (with which I meant clearly and without contradiction”), and while she points out how this “was often out of place”, 45 Mignolo as well as Rojas and Blaney and Tickner seek to place such anxiety in yet another coherent framework that holds everything together. The question arises whether this can be any different in scholarly work that is not directly based on ethnographic research itself, and which can therefore not lay claim to a direct experience of ontological controversies. This has become an important question for my own (likewise third-level) work on anti-GMO activism. My work to date has primarily aimed at making a conceptual contribution, and has relied on a conversation between the ethnographic research of others and various bodies of conceptual work, including decolonial and “ontological turn” literature.46 But as I have already indicated in relation to de la Cadena’s work, when writing up their research for academic purposes, even those who have directly experienced ontological encounters find it hard to resist the tendency to conclude their work with stringent, overarching, coherent conclusions that the Westerneducated reader can grasp and “take home”. In the next section, I will draw on two anthropological ethnographic texts that are significant for research on the GMO controversy to show how this works. The two texts that will be analysed in the next section engage with the GMO controversy in Paraguay and Mexico respectively, and they have stood out for me in the way they manage to convey a sense of unease and grappling with ontological encounters and conflicts. However, as the next section will show, they as well end up providing a framework and conclusions that can accommodate and make sense of the encountered ontological difference. 3. Ontological Encounters in the GMO Controversy According to Susana Carro-Ripalda and Marta Astier, much of the research that is carried out in relation to the question of what smallholder producers in the Global South truly think of (and say about) agricultural biotechnology is unable to grasp the “ontological incompatibility” that exists between the experienced human/nonhuman relations in small-scale agriculture on the one hand, and the logic that underlies genetic engineering (GE) on the other.47 This is precisely because most social research is itself grounded in the crucial modern/colonial nature-culture divide: the former can only be known through scientific means, while the latter can be known through the study of social/cultural/political practices. Knowledge about nature is about establishing “facts”, which are either true or false (i.e. nature as “one” is either correctly or incorrectly represented), while knowledge about culture is about studying meaning, which is necessarily (due to the existence of different cultures) multiple. The question of whether GMOs do or do not pose a “factual” danger consequently lies outside of the remit of the social sciences, which therefore focus on the social dimension of statements that are made about nature. But as Kregg Hetherington’s reflections on his own anthropological research journey in Paraguay make clear, this tacit signing-up to modern ontology can lead to difficulties in understanding the reality of the people one is interested in.48 Coming from a position in which he took for granted the scientific distinction between (proven) “fact” and “error”, Hetherington explains how he “translate[d]” the claims of the leader of a local peasant movement49 (Antonio) about the truth of (GM) soy “killer beans” into something else: Until this point, I had approached ethnography as an extended discussion with and about humans, and I was less interested in beans than I was with what Antonio said about them … To be blunt, Antonio kept pointing at the beans, and I kept looking at him … I was comfortable saying that this was a figure of speech, a kind of political rhetoric, or even to claim that this is what Antonio believed, all of which explicitly framed ‘la soja mata’ (soy kills) as data for social analysis, rather than analysis itself worthy of response.50 However, Hetherington points out that not believing in the truth of the killer bean did not prevent him from “participating in Antonio’s knowledge practices”. 51 Becoming involved in the anti-soy bean activism of the peasants, Hetherington became “part of the situation” that made the killer bean turn into a crucial agent in a court case that was brought against two soy farmers for the murder of two activist peasants. As a result, killer beans became transformed into a matter of national concern. Crucially for Hetherington, participation involved more than joining the situation in spite of his lack of belief: it led to him becoming immersed in a relation with both peasants and beans that started to have a physical impact on him—in de la Cadena’s words, he indeed became “partially connected”: 52 Beans didn’t scare me at first. Indeed, as a foreigner to the situation that gives rise to killer beans (a Canadian no less), giant fields of soy were a familiar, even a comforting sight. But it took only a few months with Antonio for me to start feeling the menace from those fields. Soon, the sweetish smell of glyphosate, recently applied, and especially the corpselike smell of 2, 4-D mixed with Tordon, could ruin my appetite and make me expect to see people emerge from their homes to show me pustules on their legs and stomachs.53 Similar observations are also found in Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s contribution to the 2014 Agriculture and Human Values symposium on the challenges of making smallholder producer voices being heard in relation to agricultural biotechnology.54 While most of the contributions to the symposium concentrate on how to tease out smallholders’ “real” voices in the most effective way, Carro-Ripalda and Astier critically reflect on their own perceived failure to become knowledgeable about smallholders’ voices in their research on GM maize cultivation in Mexico. It was through ethnographic fieldwork in rural areas in Central Mexico, in-depth structured interviews, focus groups, participant observation and, finally, a National Workshop in Mexico City with over 50 stakeholders (including smallholder producers) that Carro-Ripalda and Astier attempted to get a better sense of what the actual voices of peasants in the GM controversy were trying to convey.55 However, particularly the final workshop, which aimed to create conditions under which Mexican smallholder producers could speak on their own terms about GM maize cultivation, “unwittingly reproduced the conditions of exclusive, techno-scientific and regulatory spaces”. 56 The public discourse that centres on questions of safety, science, possibilities of regulation and problems of potential contamination, and which is upheld by both GM maize proponents and antiGMO activists, dominated the workshop debate. Even when present smallholders raised different concerns, the discussion always returned to the previous, main ones, as if those who had spoken differently “had not spoken at all”. The way that smallholders could articulate “their perceptions, ideas, and desires” was thereby “severely limited”. 57 Carro-Ripalda and Astier are focused on the dominance of one particular (techno-scientific, regulatory) discourse that, they maintain, disabled smallholder voices engaged in different discourses from speaking up or, when speaking, from being heard. In other words, smallholders were unable to adequately represent their own understanding of what is at stake in the GM maize controversy in Mexico. Considering what I have pointed out in the previous section, based on Rojas, difference is thereby transformed into an epistemological, rather than an ontological one: Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s argument is implicitly based on the assumption that, under the right conditions, difference can be translated into something that can be communicated to, and discussed with, other stakeholders. But the term “ontological incompatibility” that the authors themselves use indicates there is something else at play, which cannot easily be translated: the nature of the relation of smallholder producers to their “land, seed, crop, climate … as told and understood by themselves”; the “central place” that Maize continues to occupy in Mesoamerican pre-Hispanic cosmology, and “the social and cultural significance” that goes along with that.58 Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s emphasis on the problem of the dominant discourse, and the overarching Mexican structures of domination this discourse is related to (such as the “neoliberal vision of the Mexican agricultural future”59), makes it occasionally difficult to understand what the problem of “ontological incompatibility” really is about. At the end of the article, the place of the smallholder producers whom they have engaged seems once again clearly delineated and knowable: at stake for smallholders are, Carro-Ripalda and Astier argue, “their lives as maize cultivators, their pride in their craft and knowledge, and their ceremonially demanded right to information, choice and access to their ‘own resources’”. It is not just about “retaining ‘traditional’ ways of agriculture”, as the anti-GMO movement maintains, but also about claiming “political, economic and socio-cultural rights.”60 Though this certainly adds a significant dimension to the debate, it indeed simply seems to add to, rather than radically challenge, the frameworks that are conventionally used in the anti-GMO debate, as well as the frameworks that focus on how to bring out and represent other people’s “voices” in a better way. Is this simply unavoidable when it comes to the production of academic knowledge through/in academic writing? As already indicated in the previous section, academic writing pursues by definition the objective of enhancing knowledge and providing improved insight into a certain situation. In its very structure, an academic piece of work aims to resolve and settle, rather than to dislocate, to destabilise, or to provide discomfort. Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s article is meant to render legible their own encounter of ontological difference for an academic audience. Is it possible for the reader to dig below these representational strategies, and to relate more directly to their encounter of what they themselves call ontological incompatibility? And which has led them to brand their final workshop, in a quite un-academic way, as a “failure”? There are a few places in the article in which their inability to put into words and arguments all of “the complexity of experiences, relations and reasons that bind people to maize”61 is more obvious. Becoming attuned to this complexity is linked to the authors having to become at least “partially connected”—to yet again use de la Cadena’s phrase—to the relations they attempt to trace. It is interesting, for example, that Carro-Ripalda and Astier talk about “voices” as going beyond the semantic level, as conveying something acoustically, and as requiring a form of listening that shies away from asking pre-given questions. It is also interesting that some of that took place when they literally walked together with their interlocutors; precisely as it is emphasised by Blaney and Tickner:62 Despite the shortcomings of the workshop … we felt that that, through our research on the ground, we had engaged with male and female farmers, heard about their perspectives on GM and their visions of a rural future, and accompanied them to work in milpas and markets. So, what do smallholder farmers’ voices sound like? What meanings did they convey to us? We will provide here but a few of those sounds and meanings … 63 Despite returning to the idea of voices as conveying “meaning” in this quote, meaning is related to sounds, to walking together, to particular places with their own sounds, smells, and colours. The sample of actual “voices” Carro-Ripalda and Astier then choose to present yet again invoke an intricate sense of the relationality of farmers and nonhumans: It is a joy to plant, getting hold of the maize, of a beautiful cob which is pleasant, to go to the harvest, to look at pretty cobs, all regular. Because this is what sustains me. You can see the difference in the seeds straight away … You need to look at the cob and as soon as I grab it I see the difference. It is the person who knows the seed the one who chooses it [for replanting the following year].64 By contrast, GM maize is associated by the smallholders whom Carro-Ripalda and Astier cite with feelings of “artificiality, estrangement and distrust towards the created object (the GMO) in itself, not only because of deep ontological considerations … but because of the political and economic motives which are ‘assembled’ into it.”65 Although the authors make a distinction between ontology and politics/ economics here, their invoking of the “assemblage” precisely shows how the latter becomes part of ontology itself, and then (as in the case of Hetherington) impacts on the sensual, bodily connection with the maize. Understanding the relation between “things” in this way allows for an analysis of power and domination that has at least the potential of moving beyond pre-given frameworks; strategically suspending them in order to “sharpen [the] analysis of exactly how power operates, how relations are made and undermined, and with what consequences”. 66 Genetically modified maize is a problem because it is part of particular Mexican neoliberal visions and strategies, but in the context outlined by Carro-Ripalda and Astier, that vision is not only (and not even primarily) made sense of through given frames of knowledge, such as Marxist theories of the exploitation of labour, but sensually, through the way it disrupts the (physical) pleasure and joy that has sustained the farmer-maize-assemblage so far.67 GM technology externalises the maize from farmers and estrange them from their ways of life; and it is only through this externalisation that GM maize becomes perceivable as a potential source of “contamination”, as a danger against which farmers need to “defend” their seeds.68 Now, some might counter that the previous paragraph in practice only provides a fancy repackaging of the two well-rehearsed arguments brought forward by many anti-GMO activists: (a) that the problem of GMOs is an intrinsic property that makes it “unsafe” (which activists try to scientifically prove), and/or (b) that the fundamental problem of agricultural biotechnology is that it estranges farmers from their traditional, ancestral way of life, that it allows for their exploitation, and that it provides a further foothold for neoliberal visions of how the world should be ordered. Both arguments are grounded in modern ontology: the first goes down the route of science (contesting “facts” about the “nature” of GMOs on the basis of science itself), while the second goes down the “social” route by either making a case for the need to respect cultural multiplicity, or for the need to prevent economic exploitation. Some activists make use of all of these routes and arguments. Famous environmental activist and intellectual Vandana Shiva, for example, determines the alienating character of the GMO to be an intrinsic property, while at the same time depicting smallholder producers as intrinsic “‘reservoirs’ of local or indigenous knowledge or as ‘natural’ conservators of biodiversity through their traditional practices”. 69 According to Carro-Ripalda and Astier, this “unwittingly reinforce[es] images of smallholder producers as passive, timeless and voiceless.”70 This leads to precisely the sort of romanticised reification of “difference” that I have critiqued in the previous section of this article—paradoxically, in this case, on the basis of an ontology that is deeply modern, as it regards both “things” and “people” as ontologically stable and classifiable. By contrast, the authors of the two texts I have analysed in this section trace ontological encounters that cannot be contained by the nature/culture dichotomy. There is no pre-given (social) theory of neoliberalism and global power relations that dictates how the “voice” of the farmer needs to be made sense of. There is also no pregiven understanding of the “factual” (scientific) nature of GMOs. The notion of radical difference that comes up in these two texts emerged from precisely the “misunderstandings” that the encounter of ethnographers with “other people” and their relations brought to the fore; but importantly, it did not make any clearer to the ethnographer what the “stuff” that grounded the misunderstandings is actually composed of.71 Yet, somewhat paradoxically, despite all this emphasis on misunderstandings, incompatibility, grappling, failure, and critical self-reflection of one’s own assumptions—at the end of the day what is left for the readers (at least if they do not explicitly focus on the “ethnographic excess” found in the writings) is the impression that they know more about “stuff” than they did before: that they understand the situation better, that new knowledge has been produced, that the object of analysis is more transparent than it has been before. How can this subjugation of the encountered ontologically difference to academic strategies of comprehensive sense-making avoided (if at all)? This article itself is now coming up to what would normally be a conclusion—i.e. the treacherous waters of nailing its contribution to knowledge. Given that this article is yet again another “third-level” engagement with questions of ontology and decoloniality, the question is whether there is any way to avoid this pull of hegemonic modes of academic knowledge production. Rather than providing a conclusion and reiterate the core argument that the article has made, I will attempt to finish this piece by raising even more questions, and by providing some further reflections. 4. Turtles all the Way Down: (Further) Reflections on What Questions to Ask The pull of hegemonic systems of academic knowledge production is difficult to avoid. This is the case even in writings that are directly based on ontological encounters and controversies, and that reflect on the displacement that encountering different ontologies has entailed. But as I have indicated, this problem is even more pronounced in writings—like my own—that provide what I have previously called “third-level” sense-making of ontological encounters. The contribution of third-level analysis is usually a conceptual one, which makes it by definition veer towards the general and abstract rather than the concrete. In relation to the literature on decolonial thought and the ontological turn, this becomes manifest in three different (yet interrelated) ways: first, in the desire to provide an understanding of ontology that enables a conceptualisation of the former as multiple. Drawing on the work of Mario Blaser and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro respectively, Rojas and Blaney and Tickner argue that ontology can be thought of as multiple if reality is understood as always being “enacted” or “performed”. 72 This is what Blaser calls an understanding of ontology as “materialsemiotic”: one that defines reality as “always in the making through the dynamic relations of hybrid assemblages”. 73 Pinpointing it like this is inevitably geared towards answering the question of what reality as such, in general is about. Secondly, there is an ambition to coin the general normative-political project that arises out of this understanding with a singular concept, such as the pluriverse. Thirdly, arguments about ontological multiplicity and the emancipatory-decolonial political projects that arise out of its recognition are written for an audience of a particular discipline, such as IR: the aim is to provide a wholesale, general rethinking, or, indeed, “reconstruction” of the latter.74 What sort of questions drive conceptual work into that direction, and what desire “to know” underlies the questions? According to Cherokee philosopher Brian Yazzie Burkhart, for Native Americans “the questions we choose to ask are more important than any truths we might hope to discover in asking such questions”. 75 By contrast, Western knowledge is always (at least in the mainstream) propositional knowledge: “knowledge of the form ‘that something is so’”. Here, knowledge cannot be verified by referring to direct experiences: “there must be something underlying them and justifying them”. 76 Burkhart gives the example of the “routine response” given by “Western people” to Indigenous accounts of creation: “In [one] account, the earth rests on the back of a turtle. The Western response to this account is simply the question, ‘What holds the turtle?’” This question makes no sense to the Native storyteller, because the truth of the story lies in the paths to rightful action that it outlines, rather than what it has to say about the “reality” of the world. But when the Westerner insists on the question, the answer finally is: “‘Well, then there must be turtles all the way down’.”77 Equating Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s work with European mainstream (hence analytic) philosophy seems, at first glance, incredibly unfair. After all, those authors precisely advocate the cultivating of knowledge by direct awareness or acquaintance in exactly the way that Burkhart identifies as typical for Native Americans. But on the other hand, the framework that circumscribes their emphasis on the need for “concreteness” is still an abstract one that wants to answer the question of how things really are and should be: enacted, performed, pluriversal, … The point is not whether this argument about reality and politics is right or wrong. The point is to recognise that it is driven by particular questions that might make no sense in the context of other intelligence systems, but that need to be addressed in an academic article in order to make a conceptual argument compelling, convincing and original for an audience that primarily sits (whether it likes it or not) within a Western, colonial, hegemonic system of knowledge production.78 And even when the contribution to knowledge production is not primarily conceptual, as in the “second-level” work that I have analysed in the previous section in relation to the GMO controversy, the final argument that is made (e.g. about peasants’ economic and cultural rights) is yet again lucid and comprehensible to an audience that seeks to comprehend “stuff” within modern parameters. Where to go from here (particularly as a white, European scholar)? As suggested by Tucker, one way might be to engage in much more direct, ethnographic research, which would enable more direct experience of ontological encounters. Despite previously-mentioned problems of even that research not going far enough, there is without doubt more space for providing a sense of grappling and dislocation if the originality of a piece of work is not purely grounded in the conceptual contribution it aims to make. However, not every scholar is able— body-, context- or funding-wise—to spend extensive periods of time in different places, and the ethical and political pitfalls of researching “radical difference” through fieldwork with—but often rather on—others have been pointed out by Indigenous scholars numerous times.79 But even for those unable or unwilling to do more primary, empirical research, there is space to push the boundaries of what can and should be written about (and how). For decades there have been attempts to provide “innovative” platforms, for example at conferences, to talk about “stuff” in different ways (e.g. through storytelling or artistic practices; not at least by e.g. Indigenous peoples themselves80). However, these “innovations” are still at the margins, and they will most likely never be able to compete with acknowledged knowledge production outlets such as journal articles and scholarly books. But even within the latter, there is always at least some space to push for more open-endedness, more reflection on the author’s embodied positionality, more auto-critique, more uncertainty and grappling (even if this is based on reading about the ontological encounters of others). Although this sort of embodied self-reflection on a writer’s “situatedness” (which in my own case means being “on the colonising side of a divide”81) has obviously been advanced by many critical scholars for decades (including feminists and post- as well as decolonial scholars), this article has hopefully shown that there is still (always) a need to go further, in order to more fundamentally challenge hegemonic, modern/colonial modes of knowledge production. The sense of unease that I have outlined in section two was particularly strong when reading conclusions that were geared towards making recommendations for the discipline of IR, or for “international politics”, as such. Aiming to make generic conclusions for entire disciplines, political fields, or global “issues” pushes the generality and abstraction of a contribution even further away from an advocacy of the concrete. Why, and to whom, does it matter whether IR, as a discipline, or international politics, as object of study, becomes more pluriversal or not? What are the actual benefits of the concept of the pluriverse in the first place? Or to pick up the theme of this special issue: why does it matter whether IR is, or should move into, a mode of affirmation rather than critique?82 Why is this a good question to ask—and for whom? This is not just a theoretical problem, but it has real-life consequences for actually-existing decolonial struggles. The desire for making a generic argument about relational ontologies and a pluriversal politics harbours the danger of making a huge variety of demands and struggles that often exist in tension and contradiction with each other commensurable. Indigenous demands for the repatriation of “their” land might be at odds with the social justice demands for redistribution and “the commons”. 83 For Blaney and Tickner, decolonial thought is commensurable with not just the ontological turn literature, but also feminist and other critical interventions.84 Mignolo and Arturo Escobar advocate a transnational fight for global justice and are enthusiastic about the potential of global movements to achieve that aim together.85 Like Mignolo, Rojas explicitly draws on the World Social Forum slogan “Another world is possible” as well as the Zapatistas slogan of “a world where many words fit” to make her case about the need for a pluriversal understanding of emancipatory-decolonial politics.86 While it can be argued that this problem of seeing all these struggles and demands as commensurable goes back to a lack of actual engagement with particular decolonial practices and battles, what I have argued in this article is that it is also related to the problem of how and what sort of knowledge is produced and valued in the Western academy: knowledge that is abstract, generic, and applicable beyond a specific context. Knowledge that is driven by the desire to know what is. Knowledge that desires to know what holds the turtle—all the way down.

### AT: Hickel 21/Gupta-Nigam 18/Hicks 18---2AC

#### Technological globalization, economic growth are the only ethical systems supported by empirical evidence.

“Why they’re wrong.” ECONOMIST 16. October 1. <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21707926-globalisations-critics-say-it-benefits-only-elite-fact-less-open-world-would-hurt>.

The backlash against trade is just one symptom of a pervasive anxiety about the effects of open economies. Britain’s Brexit vote reflected concerns about the impact of unfettered migration on public services, jobs and culture. Big businesses are slammed for using foreign boltholes to dodge taxes. Such critiques contain some truth: more must be done to help those who lose out from openness. But there is a world of difference between improving globalisation and reversing it. The idea that globalisation is a scam that benefits only corporations and the rich could scarcely be more wrong.

The real pro-poor policy

Exhibit A is the vast improvement in global living standards in the decades after the second world war, which was underpinned by an explosion in world trade. Exports of goods rose from 8% of world GDP in 1950 to almost 20% a half-century later. Export-led growth and foreign investment have dragged hundreds of millions out of poverty in China, and transformed economies from Ireland to South Korea.

Plainly, Western voters are not much comforted by this extraordinary transformation in the fortunes of emerging markets. But at home, too, the overall benefits of free trade are unarguable. Exporting firms are more productive and pay higher wages than those that serve only the domestic market. Half of America’s exports go to countries with which it has a free-trade deal, even though their economies account for less than a tenth of global GDP.

Protectionism, by contrast, hurts consumers and does little for workers. The worst-off benefit far more from trade than the rich. A study of 40 countries found that the richest consumers would lose 28 [percent] of their purchasing power if cross-border trade ended; but those in the bottom tenth would lose 63 [percent]. The annual cost to American consumers of switching to non-Chinese tyres after Barack Obama slapped on anti-dumping tariffs in 2009 was around $1.1 billion, according to the Peterson Institute for International Economics. That amounts to over $900,000 for each of the 1,200 jobs that were “saved”.

Openness delivers other benefits. Migrants improve not just their own lives but the economies of host countries: European immigrants who arrived in Britain since 2000 have been net contributors to the exchequer, adding more than £20 billion ($34 billion) to the public finances between 2001 and 2011. Foreign direct investment delivers competition, technology, management know-how and jobs, which is why China’s overly cautious moves to encourage FDI disappoint (see article).

What have you done for me lately?

None of this is to deny that globalisation has its flaws. Since the 1840s advocates of free trade have known that, though the great majority benefit, some lose out. Too little has been done to help these people. Perhaps a fifth of the 6m or so net job losses in American manufacturing between 1999 and 2011 stemmed from Chinese competition; many of those who lost jobs did not find new ones. With hindsight, politicians in Britain were too blithe about the pressures that migration from new EU member states in eastern Europe brought to bear on public services. And although there are no street protests about the speed and fickleness in the tides of short-term capital, its ebb and flow across borders have often proved damaging, not least in the euro zone’s debt-ridden countries.

As our special report this week argues, more must be done to tackle these downsides. America spends a paltry 0.1% of its GDP, one-sixth of the rich-country average, on policies to retrain workers and help them find new jobs. In this context, it is lamentable that neither Mr Trump nor Mrs Clinton offers policies to help those whose jobs have been affected by trade or cheaper technology. On migration, it makes sense to follow the example of Denmark and link local-government revenues to the number of incomers, so that strains on schools, hospitals and housing can be eased. Many see the rules that bind signatories to trade pacts as an affront to democracy. But there are ways that shared rules can enhance national autonomy. Harmonising norms on how multinational firms are taxed would give countries greater command over their public finances. A co-ordinated approach to curbing volatile capital flows would restore mastery over national monetary policy.

These are the sensible responses to the peddlers of protectionism and nativism. The worst answer would be for countries to turn their backs on globalisation. The case for openness remains much the same as it did when this newspaper was founded to support the repeal of the Corn Laws. There are more—and more varied—opportunities in open economies than in closed ones. And, in general, greater opportunity makes people better off. Since the 1840s, free-traders have believed that closed economies favour the powerful and hurt the labouring classes. They were right then. They are right now.

#### Neg sustainability claims are a Malthusian trap---innovation solves.

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In Chapter 2, we discussed the Malthusian trap: long-term growth is impossible in this model because every gain in productivity generates a demographic expansion that brings GDP per capita back to subsistence level. This paradigm may seem extreme but in reality many of our fellow citizens are Malthusians without realizing it, like Monsieur Jourdain of Molière’s Le Bourgeois gentilhomme [The Middle-Class Gentleman], who speaks in prose without knowing it. This is in any case true of those who advocate for “antigrowth” as the only possible response to the constraints of limited natural resources and the urgency of climate change. Their viewpoint can be expressed as follows.

Consider an economy whose growth comes entirely from capital accumulation, in which the final production of consumer goods (known as final production) requires both capital and the extraction of natural resources. The accumulation of capital—investment—is equal to savings, and savings represents part of final production, the remainder being devoted to consumption.3 Suppose that the stock of natural resources is limited. We can prove two propositions that remain valid whether returns to capital accumulation increase or decrease with the amount of accumulated capital. First, the economy is bound to stagnate in the very long term; second, a slowdown of growth in the short term will prolong the economy’s lifespan.

To prove that the economy is bound to stagnate in the very long term, one reasons by contradiction. Suppose that the economy were to continue to grow indefinitely at a positive rate. It follows that final production would not converge toward zero over time. For this to be the case, the flow extraction of natural resources must continue above a certain level. But then the stock of natural resources will end up being depleted in a finite time. Once the stock is depleted, final production falls to zero, which contradicts the initial assumption of ever-increasing final production. Therefore, the only possible rate of growth over the long term is zero.

The second proposition—that slowing growth in the short term prolongs the lifespan of the economy—results directly from the fact that any slowdown of the economy in the short run saves natural resources, thereby making it possible to extract those resources over a longer period, which prolongs the time during which final goods can be produced.

It was this very logical and persuasive reasoning that inspired the champions of zero growth in the 1970s. The same reasoning drives the advocates of antigrowth. Can we escape this logic? Just as in the case of the Malthusian trap, the answer can be summed up in a single word: innovation. Only innovation can push back the limits of what is possible. Only innovation has the potential to improve quality of life while using fewer and fewer of our natural resources and emitting less and less carbon dioxide. Only innovation will enable us to discover new and cleaner sources of energy. For example, the introduction of nuclear power plants enabled France to reduce its CO2 emissions, and the development of renewable energies amplified this movement.

Creative destruction is a very powerful engine of change. Not only does it enable a new technology to replace an older one, it can also open the path to a radical change in production processes. And environmental urgency calls for radical change in some fields; for example, modifying the mix of energy sources to rely more on renewables requires the entire energy industry to change models. A critical question is whether innovation will be directed spontaneously toward less polluting technologies or toward technologies that use fewer natural resources, or whether, on the contrary, governmental intervention is necessary. We now turn our attention to this question.

### AT: King 17---2AC

#### Security is good.

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6. The two faces of security – and of peace Security, especially state security, tends to be enacted in contexts of the violently contested political authority. Often it is enacted through violent power, rebranded as legitimate force. Small wonder that some in the development community, including those who drafted SDG 16, hesitate to use the word at all. But although security is a deeply disputed idea, it is also a highly necessary one. Security functions simultaneously as an analytical construct, as a frame for policy and as a moral narrative. It is distinct from the equally ambiguous if less contentious concept of peace. Yet, at the same time, it is often seen as essential to the preservation of peace. Most of the things that international decision-makers, political and security elites and development practitioners do in security’s name are supposed to protect the safety and welfare of people in a world of multiple challenges and threats. However, there is a tendency to slide from global, to national, to citizen and to human security and back again, without enough serious reflection on how they interconnect and on where tensions and contradictions lie hidden. Development agencies have too often plunged into security policies and programmes, without a clear understanding of where they might lead, who would benefit and how they might go wrong. The ambiguities stem in part from a deep-seated tension between two distinct visions of security (summarised in Table 3), which interconnect, yet are in deep tension with eachother. On the one hand, security can be seen as a process of political and social ordering, aiming to reduce violence and keep the peace. As such it is territorially organised and kept in place globally as well as nationally through the authoritative discourses and practices of power, including socially sanctioned violence. It connects to conceptions of what Galtung termed ‘negative peace’: the ending of overt violence, without necessarily transforming the conditions giving rise to this violence or attending to the quality of the subsequent peace. In this view security is a public good delivered in principle by states, much like official or donor-driven development.29 Yet in a world where states and indeed the international order face sustained challenges, security is often kept in place also through alternative nonstate or ‘hybrid’ networks of violence and protection.30 Moreover, security is far from being an unalloyed public good. In principle, it is equally shared and socially inclusive, even if in practice it is anything but, especially at the insurgent margins where insecurity is most acute. For in practice it protects socially embedded power, established property relations and social privilege – and reinforces global, national and local inequalities. On the other hand, security can be seen (in the vernacular) as an entitlement of citizens and more widely human beings to social peace and protection from violence, abuses of rights and social injustice, along with other existential risks such as famine or disease. It connects to the idea of ‘positive peace’, including transformations in the social conditions giving rise to violence and deepening the relationships between states and their citizens. The vernacular understandings, day-to-day experience, resilience and agency of the people and groups who are ‘secured’ and ‘developed’ are in this view the touchstone by which to evaluate security and violence reduction. Most people fall back upon their social identities – as women and men, members of families, clans, castes, ethnic groups, sects, religions and nationalities – to navigate their social worlds, to respond to insecurity and violence and (sometimes) to organise for violence. At the same time, these identities are written into the structures of power and inequality, being deployed to establish hierarchies of citizenship and patterns of exclusion. Ensuring that security is inclusive and not simply the security of particular groups or the property of the well-armed, powerful and wealthy, is fraught with difficulty and must be negotiated at multiple levels. ‘Security in the vernacular’ is the term used here rather than the interlinked but distinct concepts of ‘human security’ and of ‘citizen security’ popularised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank,31 which fit in the conceptual toolboxes of development practitioners, humanitarian agencies and intervention forces. Both human and citizen security have come under criticism for ‘securitising’ development by framing poverty, exclusion and vulnerability through security lenses, and thus paving the way for military interventions in the affairs of fragile states.32 ‘Security in the vernacular’ paves the way for more precise and detailed empirical scrutiny of how security and plays out in particular local and national contexts. It highlights the experience and social agency of those who are ‘secured’. And it underscores the transformative potential of security as an entitlement, which can be actively claimed by those who challenge the deeply rooted legacies of insecurity, exclusion and injustice. Both these faces of security have their underside, most obviously the first. ‘Seeing like a state’ even with the best of intentions can lead to the interests of citizens being sacrificed to an unbending vision of national security or of top-down development (as even in Nyerere’s Tanzania).33 It is also open to abuse – for instance, to prop up authoritarian regimes; to advance the interests of predatory elites; to impose exclusionary economic and social policies; to justify state secrecy and surveillance of citizens; or to justify the hegemonies and military adventurism of major world powers. And it tends to be closely if complexly related to ‘seeing like a corporation’, most obviously in enclave economies, where privatised security arrangements in protected enclaves may indeed destabilise or weaken the state.34 The deformations of security in the vernacular tend to be more hidden, but no less damaging – for instance, the submission of minorities and refugees to campaigns of exclusion and violence by populist majorities; forms of popular justice that violate the rights, dignity and safety of supposed perpetrators; or grass roots endorsement of ‘traditional’ or customary institutions, which perpetuate gender and other inequities. Moreover, local-level insecurities can persist or even worsen, when a state, like India or Brazil, is considered to be stable, or a region or locality is considered to be secure. Neither face of security can be considered without the other. The relationship between them is utterly crucial. The capacity of states to protect their citizens is at the basis of the social contract.35 That is, the rights and security of citizens and people are the bedrock of state and international security – or at least they should be. But these entitlements cannot be protected without some kind of social order, however achieved. And how and by whom social order is assured are both affairs of governance and vital concerns for everyone who lives under the leaky umbrella of political authority. Political stability, durable institutions, the rule of law, and effective and accountable security apparatuses are not just desirable attributes of states but are also in many respects conditions of the security of people. However, they come at a price, not just in taxes, but also because of the need for constant vigilance to ensure that those charged with delivering security do not ignore or still worse violate the entitlements of those they are supposed to protect.

#### IR scenario analysis unlocks intellectual openness to overcome cognitive biases.

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Added-value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship

As Tomé and Açıkalın (2019) point out, in order to fill the gap between IR theory and real-world problems, “an increasing number of scholars have come to embrace a spirit of intellectual openness, recognizing both the need for greater flexibility in the theoretical formulations and the possibility of complementarity by other theories and approaches” (p. 12). This section discusses the added value of scenario analysis as a complementary approach to traditional IR methods. The most obvious advantage of scenario analysis as a methodology, grounded in the reservoir of foresight studies, lies by definition in its ability to tackle future events. As mentioned before, there are no specified instruments within traditional IR methods which would allow scholars to go beyond past and present. The only exception is forecasting, one of the formal methods in IR, which is, however, distinctly different from foresight.

The underlying logic of forecasting is to provide predictions about the future by drawing on mathematical models and big data-sets based on known patterns. Thus, it is not particularly suitable to accommodate discontinuities. Foresight, as described above, aims at going beyond existing patterns by developing alternative futures based on an innovative combination of multiple driving forces. Its goal is to capture a set of possible futures and learn from them by examining the causal relations between driving forces and their different evolutions. By applying scenario approaches, scholars can thus account for evolving dynamics and discuss such timely issues as the consequences of Brexit for both British and EU-security, economics and politics (Brakman, Garretsen, & Kohl, 2018; Martill & Sus, 2018; Musolff, 2017; Verschueren, 2017; Ziv et al., 2018). Yet, scenario analysis offers more than the possibility to talk about the future. We see a fourfold merit of adding scenario analysis to the range of methods applied by IR scholars.

Confronting enduring assumptions

As we presented in the previous section, the main feature of explorative scenarios, which are the subject of this paper, is to stimulate creative thinking by challenging the deeply held assumptions of their authors. In other words, this method is helpful for overcoming enduring cognitive biases—mental errors such as linearity, presentism, and group think caused by the subconscious and simplified information processing of humans (Heuer, 1999, pp. 111– 112). Humans have the tendencies to focus on the present at the expense of the future and to think about the future in linear terms by extrapolating past trends into the future. As Gaddis (1992) points out, “we tend to bias our historical and our theoretical analyses too much toward continuity (…) we rarely find a way to introduce discontinuities into theory, or to attempt to determine what causes them to happen” (p. 52). Even if Gaddis does not explicitly mention scenarios, he refers to the concepts underlying scenario approaches (Han, 2011, p. 51). Scenario analysis attends to “deeper, otherwise left implicit, assumptions about continuous and linear patterns of development” (Wilkinson et al., 2013, p. 707). The process of scenario development invites the participants to reveal and question convictions which have so far remained unchallenged, and to question the linearity of world developments.

The ability of reexamining one’s own assumptions and going beyond linear patterns of development is essential for IR scholarship. To illustrate it with two examples: IR scholars and historians did not think that the Soviet Union could collapse and were startled by its fall, the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the transformation of the bipolar system (Davis, 2005; Gaddis, 1992). In a similar vein, United States scholars were for decades so convinced of China’s economic, political, and cultural limitations that they neglected the possibility of its sudden ascent and were taken by surprise when it happened (Hundley, Kenzer, & Peterson, 2015). Interestingly, since the rise of China became evident, the United States debate on its future has been marked by a similar linearity of thought, leading to single-outcome predictions of China’s long-term future (Kerbel, 2004). In both cases, the discipline proved incapable of anticipating events of such importance, because scholars took for granted the status quo instead of confronting their bias towards linearity and detect manifestations of upcoming change. As a result, two major geopolitical surprises—the end of the Cold War and the rise of China have at first been neglected, forcing academia to catch up.

Against this backdrop, foresight helps IR scholars to exit the tunnel vision on world affairs and discover potentially valuable nonlinear lines of development. These can be both innovative in terms of scholarship, and policy-relevant by offering a reflection on unexpected discontinuities. Thus, it can facilitate the intellectual capability to think the unthinkable (Porter, 2016, p. 259).

Bringing forward new research questions

Scenario analysis starts with confronting one’s enduring assumptions and developing multiple causal possibilities, through which scholars can potentially discover topics that have not been examined before. One of the greatest challenges for any scholar is to identify innovative venues for research that might bring the discipline forward and advance publicity for one’s work. In Lakatosian terms, such an ability is often considered an evidence of a progressive research program.10 Since the prime feature of scenario analysis is to detect rapid and significant shifts in trajectories, or the forces behind them, this method succors when defining new pressing topics for academia. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, scenario analysis enables the detection of both weak signals and wild cards. By drawing attention to these hitherto overlooked but potentially pressing issues, scenario analysis can identify research agendas for further investigation (Barma et al., 2016). Therefore, scenario analysis seems to be the right tool to advance innovative research since it helps scholars drive their research into new areas, away from moribund topics that have been followed for many decades. By “identifying questions of likely future significance” (Barma et al., 2016, p. 6), scenario analysis can contribute to combatting the proliferation of researchers in fields occupying the political status quo, such as Soviet or Japan studies in the United States in the 1980s. At the same time, innovative research topics confront the uncertainties that are crucial for policymakers to be monitored closely.

Dealing with the complexity and interdisciplinarity of real-world issues

Another added value of the scenario analysis for IR scholarship lies in its ability to provide comprehensive causal reasoning and thus to tackle complex issues. As mentioned in the introduction, the world’s complexity combined with abrupt shifts poses a challenge for IR scholarship. The possibility to accommodate multiple driving forces, to take into account different values they might take and finally to combine them with each other and see how they affect the dependent variable, makes the scenario approach quite unique. Traditional IR methods work with a limited number of independent variables, formulate and test hypotheses usually based on the relation between a single causal variable and the dependent variable. Investigating complex causal trajectories is therefore not possible. Against this background, we agree with Barma et al. (2016) and his colleagues who argue that scenarios are highly apt for dealing with complexity and uncertainty and providing academia with a tool for “actionable clarity in understanding contemporary global issues” (p. 1).

Moreover, the scenario approach helps to tackle the challenges of interdisciplinarity that is tied to complexity. By drawing on the active participation of people from different disciplines, backgrounds, and with different expertise in the scenario development process, it brings interdisciplinarity to the table by default. The key advantage of the approach is that this interdisciplinary conversation takes place prior to and during the research phase, rather than after it. This distinguishes the scenario approach from other methods that bring interdisciplinary perspectives together but do not facilitate a discussion between them, rather letting them passively co-exist. By exploring the dynamics between seemingly unrelated vectors of change (key drivers), scenario analysis can be useful for shedding light on developments that would have been overlooked by narrower research designs. In security studies, for example, scenario analysis can connect the dots between hard, soft, traditional and non-traditional understandings of security and capture the interplay of economic-societalenvironmental and technological changes. Imposing interdisciplinarity also helps to counter the “hyper-fragmentation of knowledge” that “makes it difficult for even scholars in different disciplines to understand each other, much less policy-makers and general public” (Desch, 2015, p. 381).

Complex real-world issues that were tackled using scenario analysis include the Israel-Palestine conflict (Stein et al., 1998), Turkey’s geopolitical environment (Çelik & Blum, 2007), the prospects of the United States– China conflict (Friedberg, 2005) and the consequences of Brexit for EU foreign and security policy (Martill & Sus, 2018). An examination of these topics without the application of interdisciplinary approaches would not be possible precisely due to their multifaceted character.

Stepping out of the ivory tower

Finally, scenario analysis also enables IR scholars to establish a channel of communication with policy-makers other than conducting interviews for their own research or providing ad-hoc consultations. A participatory scenario process forges “deep and shared understanding between its participants” (Ramírez & Wilkinson, 2016, p. 21). In scenario workshops, academics and policy-makers work together, confront their world visions and assumptions and arrive at an agreement upon which they develop narratives for alternative futures. Hence, scenario analysis can be perceived as a tool towards more exchange between academia and policy-making that can contribute to a better understanding between the two worlds. For policymakers, it provides the opportunity to consider long-term trends (an occasion not often found in the day-to-day nature of politics). For academics, it provides insight into which trends are most concerning for policy-makers, allowing them to check and ultimately enhance the relevance of their research agendas.

We acknowledge the difficulty to engage policy-makers in foresight exercises caused by their time-constrains and possible lack of interest. Yet, in our experience, this problem mostly refers to high-level policy-makers. Mid-level and former officials and policy-makers have more time and willingness to participate in foresight exercises and contribute equally valuable perspectives. The participatory character of foresight exercises facilitates the exchange of views from different stakeholders on an equal level. In our case, as the evaluation has shown, it has proven to be stimulating for each of the engaged groups.

Moreover, the policy dialogue benefits from scenarios’ accessibility to a broader audience. Scenario publications tend to be shorter and easier to read than the average academic publication and as Nye (2008) rightly notes “a premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures” of academia and policy-making. Since scenario publications are more suitable to the time- and attention-constraints of many policy-makers, they improve the accessibility of research findings for the policy world (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). An illustrative example is offered by a foresight exercise conducted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in 2017. A group of academics, think tank experts and policy-makers developed scenarios on the future of the liberal world order that served as raw material for a newspaper from the future titled “The Aspen Insight” and dated October 21, 2025. Not only did the presentation of the newspaper catch the attention of many Berlin-based policy-makers but the “The Aspen Insight” was also attached as a supplement to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, and reached more than 300,000 readers.11

We acknowledge that the four aspects of the added value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship are interrelated and that their boundaries are not clear-cut. Yet, we believe, they highlight distinct benefits of this approach for academics that want to tackle the challenges of today’s world via their research.

### AT: Kato 93---2AC

#### Debating nuclear risk is good.

Aron Bernstein 18. Emeritus Professor of Physics at MIT. “Reducing the risk of nuclear war begins in the classroom”. 9-21-2018. https://thebulletin.org/2018/09/reducing-the-risk-of-nuclear-war-begins-in-the-classroom/

The need for education on nuclear weapons. When it comes to nuclear weapons, the students of today have less lived experience to draw on than older generations. Today’s typical college student was born after the end of the Cold War and has no memory of a time when most Americans were deeply afraid of nuclear war (excluding, to an extent, the fiery exchange of threats between President Trump and Kim Jong-un last year). Perhaps as a result, these students also have very limited knowledge about nuclear weapons. The majority do not have a strong understanding of what nuclear weapons are, their destructive power, or their role in the international order, and even fewer have a sense of how many nuclear weapons exist. They are not aware of the $1.2 trillion nuclear modernization program, in which the majority of costs come from modernizing and improving delivery systems rather than performing the technically necessary maintenance of the nuclear warheads. History education on the Cold War often addresses the US-Soviet arms race of that time, but nuclear weapons issues in other regions—such as the tense situation between India and Pakistan—are rarely ever mentioned. The distant, but persistent, possibility of an unintentional nuclear launch due to unauthorized access, technical failure, or a cyberattack on warning systems, is also overlooked, as is general information about which states possess nuclear weapons today.

In short, students in the United States (and likely elsewhere) typically graduate from high school having received almost no information on nuclear weapons. It is generally assumed that today’s American public simply doesn’t care about the complicated and somewhat abstract issues of nuclear weapons and deterrence because they rarely affect people’s lives directly. However, an alternative explanation exists: The American public doesn’t know enough about nuclear weapons to have much political opinion on them, but if they had more knowledge, that could change. If so, educating students on nuclear weapons on a large scale could have the long-term effect of creating an American public that is politically engaged on the nuclear issue and motivated to hold its elected leaders accountable for implementing nuclear policy that reduces the risk of nuclear war.

For some students, education on nuclear issues may have an impact beyond just putting nuclear weapons on their radar (pun intended). Today’s students are the next politicians, scientists, and journalists, and some of them will inevitably be tasked with addressing the nuclear issue in their careers. For these students, early exposure to the issues of nuclear weapons in an educational context could be useful preparation for grappling with those issues professionally. Indeed, for some students, learning about nuclear weapons could have a decisive impact on their career trajectory and inspire them to dedicate themselves to solving these problems.

### AT: Dalley 16---2AC

#### Existential fears need not be settler projections of demise but can be contingently appropriated to reverse indigenous erasure

Weiss 15—Ph.D. candidate, Anthropology, University of Chicago (Joseph, “UNSETTLING FUTURES: HAIDA FUTURE-MAKING, POLITICS AND MOBILITY IN THE SETTLER COLONIAL PRESENT,” Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Division of Social Sciences, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, December 2015, 223-232, dml)

And yet, something has changed in this landscape from the initial erasures of Native futurity we drew out in the first chapter. In the narratives of colonial actors like Duncan Campbell Scott, it was absolutely clear that “Indians” were disappearing because their social worlds were being superseded by more “civilized” ways of living and being, ones that these Native subjects would also, inevitably, in the end, adopt (or failing that, perish outright). There was a future. It was simply a settler one. But the nightmare futures of that my Haida interlocutors ward against in their own future-making reach beyond Haida life alone. Environmental collapse, most dramatically, threatens the sustainability of all life; toxins in the land and the waters threaten human lives regardless of their relative indigeneity, race, or gender (e.g. Choy 2011; Crate 2011). Put another way, the impetus for non-Haida (and non-First Nations subjects more generally) to be “united against Enbridge” with their indigenous neighbours comes in no small part because an oil spill also profoundly threatens the lives and livelihoods of non-Aboriginal coastal residents, a fact which Masa Takei, among others, made clear in Chapter 3. Nor is the anxiety that young people might abandon their small town to pursue economic and educational advantage in an urban context limited to reserve communities. Instead, the compulsions of capitalist economic life compel such migrations throughout the globe. The nightmare futures that Haida people constitute alternative futures to ward against are not just future of indigenous erasure under settler colonialism. They are erasures of settler society itself.

There is thus an extraordinary political claim embedded in Haida future-making, a claim which gains its power precisely because Haida future-making as we have seen it does not (perhaps cannot) escape from the larger field of settler-colonial determination. Instead, in Haida future-making we find the implicit assertion that Haida people can make futures that address the dilemmas of Haida and settler life alike, ones that can at least “navigate,” to borrow Appadurai’s phrasing, towards possible futures that do not end in absolute erasure. If Povinelli and Byrd are correct and settler liberal governance makes itself possible and legitimate through a perpetual deferral of the problems of the present, then part of the power of Haida future-making is to expose the threatening non-futures that might emerge out of this bracketed present, to expose as lie the liberal promise of a good life always yet to come and to attempt to constitute alternatives.

#### Anticipating nuclear extinction breeds empathy and entangled care.

Baden Offord 17. Faculty of Humanities, School of Humanities Research and Graduate Studies, Bentley Campus. “BEYOND OUR NUCLEAR ENTANGLEMENT”. Angelaki, 22:3, 17-25. 2017. Ableist language modifications denoted by brackets.

You are steered towards overwhelming and inexplicable pain when you consider the nuclear entanglement that the species Homo sapiens finds itself in. This is because the fact of living in the nuclear age presents an existential, aesthetic, ethical and psychological challenge that defines human consciousness. Although an immanent threat and ever-present danger to the very existence of the human species, living with the possibility of nuclear war has infiltrated the matrix of modernity so profoundly as to paralyse [shut down] our mind-set to respond adequately. We have chosen to ignore the facts at the heart of the nuclear program with its dangerous algorithm; we have chosen to live with the capacity and possibility of a collective, pervasive and even planetary-scale suicide; and the techno-industrial-national powers that claim there is “no immediate danger” ad infinitum.8

This has led to one of the key logics of modernity's insanity. As Harari writes: “Nuclear weapons have turned war between superpowers into a mad act of collective suicide, and therefore forced the most powerful nations on earth to find alternative and peaceful ways to resolve conflicts.”9 This is the nuclear algorithm at work, a methodology of madness. In revisiting Jacques Derrida in “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives),”10 who described nuclear war as a “non-event,” it is clear that the pathology of the “non-event” remains as active as ever even in the time of Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un with their stichomythic nuclear posturing.

The question of our times is whether we have an equal or more compelling capacity and willingness to end this impoverished but ever-present logic of pain and uncertainty. How not simply to bring about disarmament, but to go beyond this politically charged, as well as mythological and psychological nuclear algorithm? How to find love amidst the nuclear entanglement; the antidote to this entanglement? Is it possible to end the pathology of power that exists with nuclear capacity? Sadly, the last lines of Nitin Sawhney's “Broken Skin” underscore this entanglement:

Just 5 miles from India's nuclear test site

Children play in the shade of the village water tank

Here in the Rajasthan desert people say

They're proud their country showed their nuclear capability.11

As an activist scholar working in the fields of human rights and cultural studies, responding to the nuclear algorithm is an imperative. Your politics, ethics and scholarship are indivisible in this cause. An acute sense of care for the world, informed by pacifist and non-violent, de-colonialist approaches to knowledge and practice, pervades your concern. You are aware that there are other ways of knowing than those you are familiar and credentialed with. You are aware that you are complicit in the prisons that you choose to live inside,12 and that there is no such thing as an innocent bystander. You use your scholarship to shake up the world from its paralysis, abjection and amnesia; to unsettle the epistemic and structural violence that is ubiquitous to neoliberalism and its machinery; to create dialogic and learning spaces for the work of critical human rights and critical justice to take place. All this, and to enable an ethics of intervention through understanding what is at the very heart of the critical human rights impulse, creating a “dialogue for being, because I am not without the other.”13

Furthermore, as a critical human rights advocate living in a nuclear armed world, your challenge is to reconceptualise the human community as Ashis Nandy has argued, to see how we can learn to co-exist with others in conviviality and also learn to co-survive with the non-human, even to flourish. A dialogue for being requires a leap into a human rights frame that includes a deep ecological dimension, where the planet itself is inherently involved as a participant in its future. This requires scholarship that “thinks like a mountain.”14 A critical human rights approach understands that it cannot be simply human-centric. It requires a nuanced and arresting clarity to present perspectives on co-existence and co-survival that are from human and non-human viewpoints.15

Ultimately, you realise that your struggle is not confined to declarations, treaties, legislation, and law, though they have their role. It must go further to produce “creative intellectual exchange that might release new ethical energies for mutually assured survival.”16 Taking an anti-nuclear stance and enabling a post-nuclear activism demands a revolution within the field of human rights work. Recognising the entanglement of nuclearism with the Anthropocene, for one thing, requires a profound shift in focus from the human-centric to a more-than-human co-survival. It also requires a fundamental shift in understanding our human culture, in which the very epistemic and rational acts of sundering from co-survival with the planet and environment takes place. In the end, you realise, as Raimon Panikkar has articulated, “it is not realistic to toil for peace if we do not proceed to a disarmament of the bellicose culture in which we live.”17 Or, as Geshe Lhakdor suggests, there must be “inner disarmament for external disarmament.”18 In this sense, it is within the cultural arena, our human society, where the entanglement of subjective meaning making, nature and politics occurs, that we need to disarm.

It is 1982, and you are reading Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth on a Sydney bus. Sleeping has not been easy over the past few nights as you reluctantly but compulsively read about the consequences of nuclear war. For some critics, Schell's account is high polemic, but for you it is more like Rabindranath Tagore: it expresses the suffering we make for ourselves. What you find noteworthy is that although Schell's scenario of widespread destruction of the planet through nuclear weaponry, of immeasurable harm to the bio-sphere through radiation, is powerfully laid out, the horror and scale of nuclear obliteration also seems surreal and far away as the bus makes its way through the suburban streets.

A few years later, you read a statement from an interview with Paul Tibbets, the pilot of “Enola Gay,” the plane that bombed Hiroshima. He says, “The morality of dropping that bomb was not my business.”19 This abstraction from moral responsibility – the denial of the implications on human life and the consequences of engagement through the machinery of war – together with the sweeping amnesia that came afterwards from thinking about the bombing of Hiroshima, are what make you become an environmental and human rights activist. You realise that what makes the nuclear algorithm work involves a politically engineered and deeply embedded insecurity-based recipe to elide the nuclear threat from everyday life. The spectre of nuclear obliteration, like the idea of human rights, can appear abstract and distant, not our everyday business. You realise that within this recipe is the creation of a moral tyranny of distance, an abnegation of myself with the other. One of modernity's greatest and earliest achievements was the mediation of the self with the world. How this became a project assisted and shaped through the military-industrial-technological-capitalist complex is fraught and hard to untangle. But as a critical human rights scholar you have come to see through that complex, and you put energies into challenging that tyranny of distance, to activate a politics, ethics and scholarship that recognises the other as integral to yourself. Ultimately, even, to see that the other is also within.20

#### Futurism in the context of evaluating existential risks is desirable.

Tim Stevens 18. Senior Lecturer in Global Security at Kings College London. Millennium: Journal of International Studies. “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz”. 2018. pp. 283-302.

Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct. His pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former.

As Herz recognized, it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of security, sustainability and survival in the context of nuclear geopolitics and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.

68 Informed by the survival ethic outlined above, and within the overarching framework of his realist liberal internationalism, Survival Research emerged as Herz’s solution to the shortcomings of academic research, public education and policy development in the face of global catastrophe.69 It was also Herz’s plea to scholars to venture beyond the ivory tower and become – excusing the gendered language of the time – ‘homme engagé, if not homme révolté’.70 His proposals for Survival Research were far from systematic but they reiterated his life-long concerns with nuclear and environmental issues, and with the necessity to act in the face of threats to human survival. The principal responsibilities of survival researchers were two-fold. One, to raise awareness of survival issues in the minds of policy-makers and the public, and to demonstrate the link between political inaction now and its effect on subsequent human survival.

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Two, to suggest and shape new attitudes more ‘appropriate to the solution of new and unfamiliar survival problems’, rather than relying on ingrained modes of thought and practice.71 The primary initial purpose, therefore, of Survival Research would be to identify scientific, sociocultural and political problems bearing on the possibilities of survival, and to begin to develop ways of overcoming these. This was, admittedly, non-specific and somewhat vague, but the central thrust of his proposal was clear: ‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the primary responsibility of scholars to engage in survival issues’.72 Herz considered IR an essential disciplinary contributor to this endeavour, one that should be promiscuous across the social and natural sciences. It should not be afraid to think the worst, if the worst is at all possible, and to establish the various requirements – social, economic, political – of ‘a livable world’.73 How this long-term project would translate into global policy is not specified but, consistent with his previous work, Herz identified the need for shifts in attitudes to and awareness of global problems and solutions. Only then would it be possible for ‘a turn round that demands leadership to persuade millions to change lifestyles and make the sacrifices needed for survival’.

74 Productive pessimism and temporality

In 1976, shortly before he began compiling the ideas that would become Survival Research, Herz wrote:

For the first time, we are compelled to take the futuristic view if we want to make sure that there will be future generations at all. Acceleration of developments in the decisive areas (demographic, ecological, strategic) has become so strong that even the egotism of après nous le déluge might not work because the déluge may well overtake ourselves, the living.

Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se, although this is important, but the suggestion this is ‘the first time’ futurism is necessary to ensuring human survival. This is Herz the realist declaring a break with conventional realism: Herz is not bound to a cyclical vision of political or historical time in which events and processes reoccur over and again. His identification of nuclear weapons as an ‘absolute novum’ in international politics demonstrates this belief in the non-cyclical nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality.76 As Sylvest observes of Herz’s attitude to the nuclear revolution, ‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a temporal break with the past, and simultaneously carried a promise for the future’.

This ‘promise for the future’ was not, however, a simple liberal view of a better future consonant with human progress. His autobiography is clear that his experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘inevitable progress’.78 His frustration at scientism, technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but demanded a rejection of the liberal dream and the inevitability of its consummation. If the ‘new age’ ushered in by nuclear weapons, he wrote, is characterized by anything, it is by its ‘indefiniteness of the age and the uncertainties of the future’; it was impossible under these conditions to draw firm conclusions about the future course of international politics.79 Instead, he recognised the contingency, precarity and fragility of international politics, and the ghastly tensions inherent to the structural core of international politics, the security dilemma.

80 Herz was uneasy with both cyclical and linear-progressive ways of perceiving historical time. The former ‘closed’ temporalities are endemic to versions of realist IR, the latter to post-Enlightenment narratives feeding liberal-utopian visions of international relations and those of Marxism.81 In their own ways, each marginalizes and diminishes the contingency of the social world in and through time, and the agency of political actors in effecting change. Simultaneously, each shapes the futures that may be imagined and brought into being. Herz recognised this danger. Whilst drawing attention to his own gloomy disposition, he warns that without care and attention, ‘the assumption may determine the event’.82 As a pessimist, Herz was alert to the hazard of succumbing to negativity, cynicism or resignation. E.H. Carr recognised this also, in the difference between the ‘deterministic pessimism’ of ‘pure’ realism and those realists ‘who have made their mark on history’; the latter may be pessimists but they still believe ‘human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and human thought’.83 Herz would share this anti-deterministic perspective with Carr. Moreover, the possibility of agency is a product of a temporality ‘neither temporally closed nor deterministic, neither cyclical nor linear-progressive; it is rooted in contingency’.

### AT: Alt---Tuck & Yang 12---2AC

#### Incommensurability is rooted in occidentalist essentialism that undermines anti-colonial struggle thru romanticism that authenticity tests and self marginalizes natives.

Anderson 9. Chris. Michif (Métis) from western Canada; associate professor in the Faculty of Native Studies, Alberta. “Critical indigenous studies From Difference to Density,” *Cultural Studies Review* 15(2): 80-4. Emory Libraries.

In two recent articles,3 American Indian studies professor Duane Champagne challenges ‘Western’ academic disciplines’ epistemological ability to analyse contemporary Indigeneity.4 Specifically, their failure to consider Indigenous collectivities’ active role in colonial contexts in terms not readily discernable in Western forms of knowledge means these disciplines miss large elements of Indigeneity and, as such, fail to offer a plausible basis for its analysis. Champagne contends that despite its current failure to do so, American Indian studies—extrapolated here to include all Indigenous studies—should instead assume this mantle by presuming the distinctive agency of Indigenous peoples, including a focus on exploring our relations according to our distinctive epistemologies and according to the goals and mandates set by Indigenous communities. Not only will this distinguish Native studies from the rest of the academia, it will better position it to assist Indigenous peoples in righting their relationships with dominant, ‘whitestream’ society.5 I agree with Champagne’s assertion that Indigenous studies—whether within or outside specific departments and faculties—should exist in contemporary academia and that Indigenous communities ought to constitute a central focus to this endeavour. Despite his obvious love for the discipline (a fidelity I share), however, his peculiar positioning of Indigenous studies as different needlessly marginalises our density and, in doing so, unnecessarily gives ground to disciplinary turf long claimed by older disciplines. Thus, although he usefully positions Indigenous communities as producers of complex knowledge about indigeneity, his separation of Indigenous from white society unnecessarily marginalises two elements of our density critical to this relationship: 1) the extent of Indigenous communities’ knowledges about whiteness (a social fact which requires an expertise in ‘Western’ concepts); and 2) the extent to which the production of academic knowledge through Indigenous studies is shaped by the ‘whitestream’ academic relations of power, marking it in tension with other forms of knowledge (such as community knowledge). Both are unfortunate omissions. Regarding the first, the epistemological aprioris of whiteness are a dominant representational source through which Western societies produce and consume Indigeneity. As such, Champagne recklessly jettisons so-called Western disciplinary concepts and methodologies as immutable precisely where and when they are most necessary. Regarding the second, he dismisses the contextual importance of accounting for the academic institutional conditions under which native studies units (are allowed to) exist. My sympathetic critique of Champagne’s argument is divided into three major parts and a conclusion. Part one extrapolates his analysis of current native studies and his prescriptions for how to fix it. In this context I examine his charge that ‘Western’ disciplines (anthropology, history, sociology and so on) are too epistemologically constricted to properly explain Indigenous agency or communities and I emphasise his failure to account for the conditions of possibility under which Native American studies entered into academic history (to borrow Foucauldian phraseology).6 This latter element challenges the relationships he posits between both Indigenous studies and other academic disciplines and Indigenous knowledge within and outside the academy. Part two unpacks his tropes to reveal an epistemological and ontological essentialism which positions Indigeneity as separate from (his notion of) colonialism, such that an endogamous focus on the former obviates the need for accounting for the influence of the latter (or at least, that native studies can analyse the former in a manner which separates it from the Western academic herd). I argue that Champagne reproduces a variant strain of ‘Aboriginalism’ 7 that oversimplifies contemporary Indigeneity and overstates the immutability of concepts emanating from existing ‘Western’ disciplines. In doing so, he unnecessarily limits the contributions Indigenous studies is ideally positioned to make in deconstructing Aboriginalist discourses and in doing so produces an oddly parochial formulation of the discipline. Finally, in part three I offer my own prescriptions for an Indigenous studies anchored in Indigenous density (rather than difference). The temporal and epistemological complexity of our relationships with whitestream society means that Indigenous studies must counter hegemonic representations of Indigeneity which marginalise or altogether ignore our density. Following in the footsteps of Geonpul scholar Moreton-Robinson’s path-breaking work, I argue that Indigenous studies’ study of both Indigeneity and whiteness must use all available epistemologies, not just those which apparently distance Western disciplines from Indigenous studies analysis.8 While Champagne’s formulation can possibly be stretched to examine whiteness, the epistemological strategies he proposes for analysing Indigeneity capture only specific, isolated elements of our complexity. The essay ends with a discussion of the implications of this argument. I Locating (Champagne in) the discipline of native studies Native studies ‘state of the discipline’ pieces often begin by differentiating our scholarship from that of longer-standing disciplines.9 Though these are as often prescriptive as reflective of actual practice, such immanent analysis signals a healthy and growing discipline. American Indian scholar Clara Sue Kidwell suggests that, at least in native studies, these debates often play themselves out in a tension between two poles of analysis: essentialism/difference and adaptation/assimilation.10 She suggests that the essentialism cluster is rooted in an extreme form of post-colonialism which ‘implies that American Indian ways of thinking existed before colonialism and remain unknowable by anyone outside those cultures. Native American studies/American Indian studies can recover the long-suppressed values, epistemologies, and voices from colonial oppression’.11 Conversely, adaptation clusters typically emphasise the agency of Indigenous collectivities in the face of whitestream colonialism. Like the essentialism cluster, however, Kidwell argues that in its extreme variant: the idea of adaptation, or acculturation, or agency represents the ultimate disappearance of Indian identity into American society. If Indians dress like everyone else, speak like everyone else, attend public schools, are citizens of the state in which they live and citizens of the United States, how can they justify claims to a distinctive identity?12 Like others taking the essentialist position in the debate,13 Champagne contends that Indigeneity and Indigenous communities are fundamentally different in ways which elide the epistemological premises of Western disciplines (more on this in part two). These disciplines employ data collection concepts and practices saturated with a concern for ‘examining the issues, problems, and conceptualizations that confront American or Western civilization’.14 Indigenous issues are merely positioned as a specific instance of more general patterns of minority oppression.15 Such thinking has, he suggests, detracted intellectual energy from the more laudable Indigenous studies disciplinary goal of ‘conceptuali[s]ing, researching, and explaining patterns of American Indian individual and collective community choices and strategies when confronted with relations with the American state and society’.16 Champagne suggests that most native studies departments are multidisciplinary in character with faculty scattered in numerous disciplines teaching theories and concepts from numerous academic fields, to students as often as not from non-Aboriginal backgrounds, with a vague mandate for increasing or generating broader awareness about Indigenous history and contemporary realities.17 He admits that this multidisciplinarity is often advantageous in that ‘programs could be constructed from long-standing disciplines, and often seasoned scholars could be called upon to provide guidance and support’.18 However, to the extent that concepts central to Western disciplines remain ‘oriented toward examining the issues, problems, and conceptualizations that confront American or Western civilization’,19 these approaches effectively stifle the ability of American Indian studies to produce disciplinarily endogamous theory and methodology. The existing Indigenous studies academic landscape is thus, Champagne explains, littered with disjointed and epistemologically scattered forays into (and about) Indigenous communities. The current inability to produce distinctive theory and method has exacerbated institutional marginality (his context is American but this is readily extrapolated more broadly): fiscal conservativism limits the likelihood that even well-meaning administrators will build-in the solid, permanent funding required for stable Native studies departments (since money made available for ‘Aboriginal issues’ is just as likely to go to more wellregarded disciplines such as anthropology, history or education); broader multicultural or diversity concerns overshadow the distinctiveness of Indigenous experiences by linking them to broader forms of ‘minority’ oppression (thus the seemingly natural fit of native studies departments within ‘ethnic studies’ faculties); and mainstream theorising and methodological thinking has shown a reluctance to ‘think outside the box’ of Western modes of analysis.20 Champagne argues in a nutshell that: the university bureaucratic environment, weak resource support, the emphasis on race and ethnic paradigms over an indigenous paradigm, and the relegation of Indian Studies to serve general diversity interests for the university will continue to constrain, and often will prevent, full development of indigenous studies departments and programs at many universities.21 Champagne’s understanding of native studies’ relationship to the academy is reminiscent of the humanism Foucault critiques in his examination of nineteenth- and twentieth-century sexuality regulation.22 Foucault takes such explanations to task for their tendency to position power repressively as an entity which prevents actions and curtails freedoms. Foucauldian notions of power instead stress its repressive and constitutive character. They emphasise how discursive power shapes the formation of subjectivities which, in turn, shape the conditions under which subjects ‘enter into history’. Wedded to a repressive understanding of power, Champagne makes a homologous correlation between the current academic institutional marginality of Native studies and the forms of marginality Indigenous communities experience outside the academy. Thus correlated, he argues that a robust and holistic Indigenous paradigm can assist in rectifying this repression. For Champagne, then, academic and nonacademic Indigenous knowledge are comrades-in-arms, with Indigenous studies—anchored in an Indigenous paradigm—providing the missing link. In this guise, his Indigenous paradigm places Indigenous communities and nations at its centre, instead of colonial critique. Native studies, Champagne explains, ‘cannot center on a critique of the colonial experience but rather must focus on the individual and community choices American Indians make to realize their culture, values, and political and economic interests within the constraints and opportunities presented by changing colonial contexts’.23 While colonial critique can be useful for examining external forces relating to political, legal and market conditions, it ‘exclude[s] choice and social action on the part of Native historical and cultural experience, and in effect American Indians are not analyzed as players in their own historical contexts but rather viewed as billiard balls knocked around by powerful colonial powers and forces’.24 Champagne thus draws a clear distinction between, on the one hand, what he thinks Western disciplines, with their focus on colonialism, can explain about indigeneity and on the other, what makes Indigenous peoples truly Indigenous and, presumably, what these disciplines remain unable to explicate. Perhaps equally importantly, he assumes that such boundaries are discrete and readily discernable, such that he effectively erases the object–subject relationship within which all other academic disciplines produce knowledge.25 Champagne’s ostensible focus on Indigenous communities reflects a central disciplinary trope of native studies. For example, Cook-Lynn states bluntly that ‘Indian Studies as an academic discipline was meant to have as it constituencies the native tribal nations of America and its major purpose the defense of lands and resources and the sovereign right to nationtonation status’.26 This emphasis on tribally specific knowledge is also emphasised by Muskogee scholar Craig Womack, who argues the need for ‘more attention devoted to tribally specific concerns’ in a literary context,27 part of a larger ‘literary nationalism’ movement with broadly allied concerns.28 Holm et al. argue even more specifically that native studies should emphasise the exploration and support of and for what they term ‘peoplehood’, positioned to include language, sacred history, territory and ceremony,29 while Kidwell suggests that native studies should endeavour to emphasise Indigenous relationships with land, the inclusion of Indigenous intellectual traditions, our inherent sovereignty and the importance of our Indigenous languages.30 Thus, while Champagne’s focal concerns are not abnormal, his attempt to isolate Indigenous communities epistemologically from the broader social fabric of dominant, whitestream society effectively removes a large part of our arsenal for combatting the damaging representations of Indigeneity woven into larger society. Parts of his argument turn on the idea that colonialism exists external to Indigenous communities and nations, as something we are subject to. Thus, it isn’t that we don’t suffer (from) colonialism; rather, its power resides outside our communities. From this perspective, theories of colonialism are explanatory tools but are not enough in-and-of-themselves because their externality precludes their ability to fully comprehend and analyse our communities’ distinctiveness. In line with the repressive formulation of power which anchors his understanding of Indigenous studies, for Champagne colonialism = sameness/assimilation and indigeneity = difference/freedom. I will have more to say on this below, but suffice it to say for now that his prescriptions become particularly problematic when he attempts to circumscribe the theories and methods native studies should use in analysis of/with Indigenous communities. One can perhaps forgive Champagne’s diagnosis in this context, since it represents only part of his argument and, as I said, is a common trope of Indigenous studies. However, consider a fuller example of his positioning of colonialism: Colonial theories emphasize external forces such as political, legal, market, and cultural constraints and hegemonies to which American Indian communities are subject. Colonial arguments are powerful tools and explain much change in American Indian communities, but the kind of change that is explained is externally enforced and often coercive. Such change is often subtly resisted and not internalized. [footnote omitted] An old Spanish saying is ‘I bend my knee but not my heart’.31 While his statements might legitimately swell our hearts with pride at the ways our ancestors resisted colonialism/oppression while retaining their dignity, traditions and collective self consciousness, they nonetheless avoid questions about how the cultural power of nationstates do not merely oppress, but seduce as well.32 Champagne’s essentialism in effect marginalises the complex ways in which our Indigenous habitus (to borrow from Pierre Bourdieu) is inevitably and irrevocably constituted in and by the fields of struggle we occupy.33 His colonialism thus staggers between a vulgar Marxism which stresses an autonomous subject who can/must reject (or accept) colonialism and an equally vulgar structural-functionalism that measures Indigenous agency and collective choices against a Cartesian indigeneity which exists outside the life and reach of contemporary nation-states’ cultural power.

#### Theorizing indigenous perspectives is not enough---contextualizing those perspectives to specific demands, defending their consequences, and submitting them to oppositional testing are all prerequisites to decolonial praxis.

Rauna Kuokkanen 10. Assistant Professor in Political Science and Aboriginal Studies at the University of Toronto, Sámi. “The Responsibility of the Academy: A Call for Doing Homework”. Journal of Curriculum Theory Vol. 26, Iss. 3, (2010): 61-74.

It is important to note that when we talk about indigenous peoples' relationship with their lands, it is not a question of whether an individual may or may not have a relationship with her or his environment. Obviously, it is important to distinguish between a philosophy or a worldview and individual thinking and behaviour which may not always reflect or comply with the former. Moreover, my intention here is not to evoke the stereotype of 'ecological Indian' or any other variety of the Noble Savage, but to consider how certain aspects of indigenous life philosophies can inform our rethinking the notion of responsibility and how that could be applied in endeavours aimed at decolonizing and transforming the hegemonic academy characterized by sanctioned epistemic ignorance. In the context of rapid corporatization of the academy, there is a pressing need to envision alternatives that oppose the destructive agendas affecting all of us. The pervasive nature of neoliberal corporate mentality is also reflected in the (willy-nilly) adoption of its values such as the externalization of social responsibility by many academics. It seems that the ethos and values of corporations and consumer culture are increasingly influencing the academy. In the former, social responsibility is considered a distortion of business principles (Bakan, 2004, p. 35), whereas in the latter, "we are actively prevented from exercising care and living in ecologically-embedded and responsible ways" (Plumwood, 2002, p. 16). As a result, we have academics, including many 'revolutionary scholars,' who prefer to point fingers rather than start examining their own roles in espousing new forms of social responsibility. As Grande (2004) contends:

In this context, the voices of indigenous and other non-Western peoples become increasingly vital, not because such peoples categorically possess any kind of magical, mystical power to fix countless generations of abuse and neglect, but because non-Western peoples and nations exist as living critiques of the dominant culture, providing critique-al knowledge and potentially transformative paradigms. (p. 65)

What is more, elaborating a different logic-that of the gift-in and for contemporary contexts is different from the trend of evoking (often undefined) 'traditions' and formulating action plans grounded on cultural authenticity, nationalism or separatism. An uncritical reinscription of tradition is problematic for many reasons but particularly because of the real dangers of further excluding already marginalized groups such as indigenous women (Green, 2004; LaRocque, 1997).

However, the reality is that contemporary indigenous peoples generally continue to be culturally, socially, economically and spiritually more directly dependent on their lands and surrounding natural environments. This thinking is still a central part of indigenous philosophies while for many other peoples, this previously existing connection and relationship with the physical surroundings started to erode generations ago as a result of modernization, colonization and other developments since the Renaissance and Enlightenment which continue today in the form of neocolonialism and patriarchal global capitalism.

In cultures and societies that foreground reciprocity, individuals are brought up with an understanding and expectation of acting for others. In other words, the notion of responsibility is an integral part of being human and an inseparable part of one's identity. Armstrong (1996), an Okanagan writer and educator, articulates her identity and thus, her responsibilities, as follows:

I know the mountains, and by birth, the river is my responsibility: They are part of me. I cannot be separated from my place or my land. When I introduce myself to my own people in my own language, I describe these things because it tells them what my responsibilities are and what my goal is. (p. 461)

By recognizing her responsibilities, Armstrong knows her location and her role in her community; in short, she knows who she is. This notion of responsibility stems from a perception of interrelatedness of all life forms-that it is her responsibility to ensure the well-being of the mountains and river because it is directly related to her personal as well as to her community's well-being. Nuu-chah-nulth hereditary whaling chief and the founding Chair of the World Council of Whalers, Happynook (2000), elaborates this understanding as follows:

When we talk about indigenous cultural practices we are in fact talking about responsibilities that have evolved into unwritten tribal laws over millennia. These responsibilities and laws are directly tied to nature and are a product of the slow integration of cultures within their environment and the ecosystems. Thus, the environment is not a place of divisions but rather a place of relations, a place where cultural diversity and bio-diversity are not separate but in fact need each other. (n.p.)4 In western philosophical tradition, responsibility is considered a complex concept discussed and theorized by numerous scholars. Gasché (1995), for example, argues that "[t]here is perhaps no theme more demanding than that of 'responsibility'" (p. 227). A normative definition in this tradition views responsibility "as a mechanical application of a framework of rules that simultaneously relieves the subject of the onus of decision and, hence, of all liability" (Gasché, 1995, p. 227). On the other hand, however, responsibility implies a responsible response which can take place "only if the decision is truly a decision, not a mechanical reaction to, or an effect of, a determinate cause" (Gasché, 1995, p. 227). Gasché (1995) further notes that considering responsibility involves a number of risks and thus, "[a] responsible discourse on responsibility can indeed only assert itself in the mode of a 'perhaps'" (p. 228). For Heidegger, responsibility is "a response to which one commits oneself" (as cited in Gasché, 1995, p. 228). This idea of responsiveness or respondence is further explicated by Spivak whose notion of responsibility reflects Bakhtin's articulation of 'answerability.'6 Spivak (1994) proposes that response: involves not only 'respond to,' as in 'give an answer to,' but also the related situations of 'answering to,' as in being responsible for a name (this brings up the question of the relationship between being responsible for/to ourselves and for/to others); of being answerable...( p. 22)

Responsibility signifies the act of response which completes the transaction of speaker and listener, as well as the ethical stance of making discursive space for the 'other' to exist. For Spivak, "ethics are not just a problem of knowledge but a call to a relationship" (Spivak, Landry, & Maclean, 1996, p. 5). If responsibility cannot be merely mechanical expectation to answer, what does it mean, then, to call for a willingness to give a response and for ability to response (i.e., response-ability)?

Responsibility necessitates knowledge. It requires knowing how to respond but also act in a responsible manner. Derrida (1992) suggests that "not knowing, having neither a sufficient knowledge or consciousness of what being responsible means, is of itself a lack of responsibility" (p. 25). If knowledge is a prerequisite for responsibility, ignorance presents a serious threat to responsible, response-able behaviour and thinking. Moreover, responsibility demands action:

If it is true that the concept of responsibility has, in the most reliable continuity of its history, always implied involvement in action, doing, a praxis, a decision that exceeds simple conscience or simple theoretical understanding, it is also true that the same concept requires a decision or responsible action to answer for itself consciously, that is, with knowledge of a thematics of what is done, of what action signifies, its causes, ends, etc. (Derrida, 1992, p. 25)

Responsibility as action beyond theorizing poses a possibility of an interruption: "there is no responsibility without a dissident and inventive rupture with respect to tradition, authority, orthodoxy, rule, or doctrine" (Derrida, 1992, p. 27). Responsibility as a rupture of tradition may sound at odds with indigenous perceptions and practices of responsibility which emphasize the continuance of tradition. However, no tradition is static, remaining unchanged throughout history, as indigenous people also repeatedly stress, particularly when confronted by irresponsible demands for authenticity. There has always been a rupture, both inventive (usually from within) and intrusive, and interventionist (usually from without).6 In the context of the academy, responsibility with an inventive rupture implies, first and foremost, the ability of interrupting the self, of moving beyond the 'I' as the ethical subject (Derrida, 1997, p. 52).

Although the academy is prone to list its responsibilities in its lofty vision statements and to call for the responsibilities of students and researchers, we frequently witness the unwillingness of the institution itself to respond, to be answerable and take action. Instead of opening up toward the other, the representatives who feel implicated become defensive or remain silent. As Derrida notes in the above quote, responsibility links consciousness with conscience. It is inadequate to merely know one's responsibilities; one also has to be conscious of the consequences of one's actions. Without conscience, there is a risk of the arrogance of a 'clean conscience.'

Derrida further calls for "new ways of taking responsibility" in the academy which are critical of the professionalization of the university (Derrida, 1983). These new ways would signify rethinking the university institution, examining its disciplinary structures and in particular, "a new way of educating students that will prepare them to undertake new analyses" (Derrida, 1983, p. 16). Moreover, Derrida (1983) notes:

New responsibilities cannot be purely academic. If they remain extremely difficult to assume, extremely precarious and threatened, it is because they must at once keep alive the memory of a tradition and make an opening beyond any program, that is, toward what is called the future. ( p. 16)

New ways of taking responsibility in the academy are linked to the question: What constitutes a 'good' university? If the new responsibilities cannot be purely academic, the answers cannot always be found there either. One has to make an opening beyond the academy. I suggest considering the Okanagan concept of En'owkin that signifies a process of group commitment to find the most appropriate solutions through a respectful dialogue. En'owkin is a collective process that seeks to find ways to include those voices that are in a minority. En'owkin recognizes that these voices are most needed and that understanding these voices is critical for meaningful, good governance. Practiced in community and extended family circles, the idea of En'owkin is not to make decisions but to hear all the voices. The premise of En'owkin is that nobody alone can have the answers and that if somebody is arguing for his or her point, there is no need to listen. The most important aspect is not to stage an argument but to ensure that every perspective is being heard. In other words, En'owkin implies that one is not participating in the process in order to debate or enforce one's own agenda but to try to understand the most oppositional thinking to one's own and recognize its importance so that the difference becomes diversity. If these aspects of listening and dialoguing are not taken into account and followed, there are no rational outcomes and as a result, people are taking serious risks for the next generations (Armstrong,1996).7 As with the logic of the gift and gift giving practices, it is not difficult to see how the principles of En'owkin could be practiced in the academy in the name of a 'good' university that is ready to take its responsibilities in a new way, beyond the academy.

#### Decolonization centered on land return is untenable---they can’t settle territorial disputes between native communities---that intensifies colonial violence.

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Representations of space in the social sciences are remarkably dependent on images of break, rupture, and disjunction. The distinctiveness of societies, nations, and cultures is based upon a seemingly unproblematic division of space, on the fact that they occupy "naturally" discontinuous spaces. The premise of discontinuity forms the starting point from which to theorize contact, conflict, and contradiction between cultures and societies. For example, the representation of the world as a collection of "countries," as in most world maps, sees it as an inherently fragmented space, divided by different colors into diverse national societies, each "rooted" in its proper place (cf. Malkki, this issue). It is so taken for granted that each country embodies its own distinctive culture and society that the terms "society" and "culture" are routinely simply appended to the names of nation-states, as when a tourist visits India to understand "Indian culture" and "Indian society," or Thailand to experience "Thai culture," or the United States to get a whiff of "American culture." Of course, the geographical territories that cultures and societies are believed to map onto do not have to be nations. We do, for example, have ideas about culture-areas that overlap several nation-states, or of multicultural nations. On a smaller scale, perhaps, are our disciplinary assumptions about the association of culturally unitary groups (tribes or peoples) with "their" territories: thus, "the Nuer" live in "Nuerland" and so forth. The clearest illustration of this kind of thinking are the classic "ethnographic maps" that purported to display the spatial distribution of peoples, tribes, and cultures. But in all these cases, space itself becomes a kind of neutral grid on which cultural difference, historical memory, and societal organization are inscribed. It is in this way that space functions as a central organizing principle in the social sciences at the same time that it disappears from analytical purview. This assumed isomorphism of space, place, and culture results in some significant problems. First, there is the issue of those who inhabit the border, that "narrow strip along steep edges" (Anzaldua 1987:3)of national boundaries. The fiction of cultures as discrete, object-like phenomena occupying discrete spaces becomes implausible for those who inhabit the borderlands. Related to border inhabitants are those who live a life of border crossings-migrant workers, nomads, and members of the transnational business and professional elite. What is "the culture" of farm workers who spend half a year in Mexico and half a year in the United States? Finally, there are those who cross borders more or less permanently- immigrants, refugees, exiles, and expatriates. In their case, the disjuncture of place and culture is especially clear: Khmer refugees in the United States take "Khmer culture" with them in the same complicated way that Indian immigrants in England transport "Indian culture" to their new homeland. A second set of problems raised by the implicit mapping of cultures onto places is to account for cultural differences within a locality. "Multiculturalism" is both a feeble acknowledgment of the fact that cultures have lost their moorings in definite places and an attempt to subsume this plurality of cultures within the framework of a national identity. Similarly, the idea of "subcultures" attempts to preserve the idea of distinct "cultures" while acknowledging the relation of different cultures to a dominant culture within the same geographical and territorial space. Conventional accounts of ethnicity, even when used to describe cultural differences in settings where people from different regions live side by side, rely on an unproblematic link between identity and place.' Although such concepts are suggestive because they endeavor to stretch the naturalized association of culture with place, they fail to interrogate this assumption in a truly fundamental manner. We need to ask how to deal with cultural difference while abandoning received ideas of (localized) culture. Third, there is the important question of postcoloniality. To which places do the hybrid cultures of postcoloniality belong? Does the colonial encounter create a "new culture" in both the colonized and colonizing country, or does it destabilize the notion that nations and cultures are isomorphic? As discussed below, postcoloniality further problematizes the relationship between space and culture. Last, and most important, challenging the ruptured landscape of independent nations and autonomous cultures raises the question of understanding social change and cultural transformation as situated within interconnected spaces. The presumption that spaces are autonomous has enabled the power of topography to conceal successfully the topography of power. The inherently fragmented space assumed in the definition of anthropology as the study of cultures (in the plural) may have been one of the reasons behind the long-standing failure to write anthropology's history as the biography of imperialism. For if one begins with the premise that spaces have always been hierarchically interconnected, instead of naturally disconnected, then cultural and social change becomes not a matter of cultural contact and articulation but one of rethinking difference through connection. To illustrate, let us examine one powerful model of cultural change that attempts to relate dialectically the local to larger spatial arenas: articulation. Articulation models, whether they come from Marxist structuralism or from "moral economy," posit a primeval state of autonomy (usually labeled "precapitalist"), which is then violated by global capitalism. The result is that both local and larger spatial arenas are transformed, the local more than the global to be sure, but not necessarily in a predetermined direction. This notion of articulation allows one to explore the richly unintended consequences of, say, colonial capitalism, where loss occurs alongside invention. Yet, by taking a preexisting, localized "community" as a given starting point, it fails to examine sufficiently the processes (such as the structures of feeling that pervade the imagining of community) that go into the construction of space as place or locality in the first instance. In other words, instead of assuming the autonomy of the primeval community, we need to examine how it was formed as a community out of the interconnected space that always already existed. Colonialism, then, represents the displacement of one form of interconnection by another. This is not to deny that colonialism, or an expanding capitalism, does indeed have profoundly dislocating effects on existing societies. But by always foregrounding the spatial distribution of hierarchical power relations, we can better understand the process whereby a space achieves a distinctive identity as a place. Keeping in mind that notions of locality or community refer both to a demarcated physical space and to clusters of interaction, we can see that the identity of a place emerges by the intersection of its specific involvement in a system of hierarchically organized spaces with its cultural construction as a community or locality.